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ABSTRACT
In 1947/ the Taft-Hartley Act/ officially the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947/ was enacted into Federal 
law. Section 14(b) of the Act permitted states to enact 
legislation restricting union security arrangements to a 
greater extent than did the Federal law. This made possible 
the present right-to-work controversy. Right-to-work laws 
are state laws prohibiting all forms of union security 
arrangements.
By January/ 1962/ there were right-to-work laws in
effect in 19 states. Ever since the enactment of right-to-
• *“
work proposals into law in these states there has been con­
siderable controversy concerning the practical effects of 
these laws banning union security.
The purpose of this study was to determine the effects 
of these laws upon union organization/ growth, and effective-* o
ness, and whether they promote better labor-management rela­
tions and industrial peace or whether they promote strife 
and disrupt industrial peace. The ultimate goal of this 
study was to determine whether right-to-work laws have had
any effect upon industrial growth in the states that have
adopted them because of their effects on union organization,
4 '
growth, and effectiveness and because of their effects on 
labor-management relations and industrial peace.
The study considers first, the history and development 
of public policy toward union security arrangements as a 
problem in imperfect competition. This is followed by a dis­
cussion and comparison of plant location theories and prac­
tices, and an analysis of the proper place and importance 
of right-to-work laws in the locating decision of an 
employer.
An inquiry was then conducted into the actual effects 
of right-to-work laws on unions and industrial peace. This 
inquiry was made by use of a questionnaire, interviews, and 
correspondence with state APL-CIO offices, state Chamber of
Commerce organizations, and selected employers in all the
/
right-to-work/states.
This study allows the drawing of some definite con­
clusions regarding the practical effects of right-to-work 
proposals in states which have adopted them as law.
1. Right-to-work laws impede union organization, 
growth, and effectiveness. They cause member "drop outs"
xii
when first enacted and make recruiting of new members a con­
tinuous and difficult problem. Unions find it more difficult 
to organize new plants in right-to-work states, and even 
though they succeed in organizing a plant they are less able, 
in general, to negotiate as good contract provisions.
2. Right-to-work laws have an adverse effect on 
labor-management relations and industrial peace. Both unions 
and employers process more minor grievances as a result of
k
right-to-work laws. The grievance becomes a device used by 
unions for campaigning for the membership of workers and a 
device used by employers to harass the union. In situations 
where the injunction can be used against certain union 
activity forbidden under the statute, some employers abuse 
its use to impede union activity generally.
3. As an economic factor in industrial growth, these 
effects of right-to-work laws are limited in scope, and where 
they have any beneficial effect at all, it is small. Right- 
to-work laws have no relevance to market-based location 
factors which are the most important of all the economic 
location factors to most firms. Labor cost is just one of 
many cost-based location factors. Right-to-work laws are one 
facet in the total employer-employee relationship and offer
xiii
the probability of some reduction in labor cost. Although 
this is a favorable factor/ it is not sufficient to be 






The field of investigation for' this study in the area 
of labor-management problems was narrowed to a consideration 
of the effects of right-to-work laws on industrial growth 
through their impaction union growth and organization efforts 
in the states having such laws.
It was the purpose of this study to determine wTfether 
or not these laws impede or implement union growth, whether 
they increase or decrease union organization problems, and 
whether they promote better labor-management relations and 
industrial peace or promote strife and disrupt industrial 
peace. Wherever possible it was intended to relate these 
effects of this type of legislation to industrial growth.
SCOPE OF STUDY
The geographic scope of this study was limited to
tthose states that had enacted right-to-work laws prior to
January 1, 1962.  ̂ The only aspect of these laws that was 
under consideration was the effect that they have had upon 
industrial growth in these states through their effects on 
union growth and organizational problems.
It was necessary to develop briefly the historical 
events and reasons that led to the enactment of these laws 
in order to determine their basic underlying intent. It 
was also necessary to review the reasons that both proponents 
and opponents gave for and against them and to examine the 
laws themselves and the particular circumstances and events 
leading to their passage or rejection. In addition it was 
necessary to compare different theories of industrial loca­
tion and the assumptions upon which they are based in order 
to relate the effects of these laws upon union growth and 
organization to the location of industrial activity.
STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE
From the time that the Labor Management Relations Act 
became law in 1947 many statements had been voiced pertain­
ing to right-to-work laws. These included statements by 
advocates of right-to-work laws such as: "You may well ask:




'What can I do about stemming the growth of union monopoly 
2power?'"
The nationwide application of the principle of 
right-to-work is virtually the only hope of break­
ing the hold of the labor bosses on the Nation's 
jugular vein."*
These statements were countered with comments such as:
The goal of the "right to work" propagandists 
is simple and direct, despite their high-flown 
language. It is low wages that they seek, through 
laws that interfere with collective bargaining and 
hamper trade union growth.4
The proponents were quick to reply that it was only the "bad"
union activities that would be hampered, saying:
No, gentlemen, the purpose of Right to Work is 
not to destroy unions. Such a law protects both 
union and non-union men. It insures that the 
employee who wishes to do so may refuse to join a 
union. It enables these employees who wish to 
join unions to secure more responsible leadership 
at the union local level.^
Kenneth C. Kellar, The Right To Work Movement Is 
Again On The March I The National Right To Work Committee, 
Washington, D. C., 1962.
3Reed Larson, "Forty-Four Words," Spotlight No. K- 
503, Committee for Constitutional Government Inc., New York, 
1950.
^CIO Department of Education and Research (pamphlet), 
What1s Behind the Drive for "Right To Work" Laws? Congress 




Prom this, the proponents come to the following conclusion:
We think that in Nebraska we have the best business 
climate in the nation. We believe in individual ef­
fort, initiative, and freedom of choice. I am con­
vinced that Nebraska has a minimum of labor strife 
because it adopted a Right To Work amendment to its 
constitution more than 15 years ago.6
The opponents make this final rejoinder:
In reality, "right to work" laws aid no one—  
neither workers, business nor the community— other 
than a very small percentage of low^wage, anti­
union employers.^
The parties to the argument disagreed as to the ulti­
mate effect of the right-to-work laws on industrial peace 
and economic growth, but it was interesting to note that 
both'sides accepted the proposition that right-to-work laws 
do hamper union growth and organizational efforts.
The purpose and aim of this study was to answer such 
questions as: In cases where the workers are already organ­
ized do right-to-work laws really affect unionization? Do 
many members drop out? Do free riders increase? Has there 
been an effect on the nature and frequency of grievances?
^Senator Jack Romans, Labor Committee Chairman, 
Nebraska State Legislature, cited in America1s Choice Right 
To Work Or Compulsory Unionism (pamphlet), National Right 
to Work Committee, Washington, D. C., 1962,-p. 9.
^The CIO News, December 27, 1954.
5
Has the union become more militant? Is the union able to
negotiate substantially the same contract that it could
before? In cases where the workers are not yet organized
what has been the effect of right-to-work laws on union
organizing efforts? What has happened to the number of col-
t/ lective-bargaining elections held? Has there been a change
in the percentage of such elections won by unions? What has
happened to the number and disposition of unfair labor prac- 
!trees charges against employers and unions after the passage 
of right-to-work laws? Has there been a change in the use 
of the injunction by state courts? It was the further pur­
pose and aim of this study to relate to industrial growth any 
change in union growth and organization which might be dis­
covered and attributed to right-to-work laws.
PROCEDURE FOLLOWED IN CONDUCTING RESEARCH
A researcher may proceed in many ways to find the 
factual data with which to develop his study but before he 
can begin he must have determined his problem. The area of 
labor-management problems has been of interest to this re­
searcher for several years, so the basic step of determining 
the area for research was not difficult. The second step, 
that of narrowing the area to a particular segment, was only
a matter of selecting one from the many problems existing in 
‘the larger area.
The union security issue is still one of the major 
sources of conflict in labor-management relations in this 
country. The debate over the role of government in this. 
issue complicates it greatly. State right-to-work laws are 
one facet of that debate. Many Americans seem to know very
little about this issue. Both sides accept the proposition
]that right-to-Work laws hinder union growth and organizational 
efforts; however/ they do not agree on the effect that this 
will have on industrial peace and economic growth.
The question of whether or not the right-to-work laws 
hinder or impede union growth, increase or decrease union 
organizational problems, and whether they thus promote better 
labor-management relations and industrial peace or promote 
strife and disrupt industrial peace was selected because the 
answer is a prime mover in the problem of the effect of 
right-to-work laws on industrial growth.
The research pattern used in developing the factual 
data for this study had four phases.
t
1. Careful examination of works previously com­
pleted by other writers, researchers, newsmen, and 
parties at interest. This included extensive use 
of government documents published pertaining to the 
subject.
2. The use of a questionnaire.
3. Personal interviews.
4. Correspondence with persons inaccessible for 
personal interviews due to the limitations of time, 
distance and personal finances.
The source of material used in this study was largely
\
a matter of discovery and expediency and included works of 
others, government documents, and persons with whom inter­
views were held and correspondence exchanged. Before select­
ing any of this material for use however, an attempt was made 
to determine whether the opinions and thoughts expressed by 
these men in the interviews and correspondence and in the 
books, articles, pamphlets, news releases and periodicals 
were typical of the average opinion or view held by sudh'men 
or sources. There are many other sources available that 
would be of considerable value in the further development of 
more specific areas related to the subject of this study.
SUMMARY
The basic reason for this study was to determine the 
effect of right-to-work laws on union growth and organiza­
tional efforts. ^In so doing the intent was to indicate the 
long-range changes that this type of legislation might have
upon industrial growth within the states that have enacted it.
A
8
The limitations of the research process for this dis­
sertation were discussed in order to dispel from the reader's 
mind at once the idea that this work will provide the final 
and only solution to the problem.
The procedures of literature research, interview and 
correspondence used in the research process were explained 
to show the magnitude of the problem area, to indicate how 
the source materials were developed, to aid others in their 
judgment of the thoroughness of the research, and to suggest 
where other research areas might lie.,
\
CHAPTER II
THE RIGHT-TO-WORK CONTROVERSY 
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS PROHIBIT UNION SECURITY AGREEMENTS
State right-to-work laws deal with "union security" 
or compulsory union membership. Union security provisions 
in collective bargaining agreements take several forms.
There are:
1. The Closed Shop. The employer agrees to hire 
only union members.
2. The Union Shop. The employer may hire non-union
. . &members, but such workers must join the union within a 
specified period of time, usually 30 days, and must maintain 
union membership while employed.
The Union Shop with Preferential Hiring. The 
employer must hire union members if available but may hire 
non-members if union members are not available. Non-members 
must join the union within a specified period of time and 
maintain union membership.
4. "The Modified Union Shop. Employees who are not
10
union members at the time of signing the contract need not 
join the union, but all workers hired thereafter must join.
5. Maintenance of Membership. All employees who 
are members of the union after a specified period of time 
after the contract is signed and all who later join the 
union must remain members in good standing during the life
of the contract. Usually a 15-day withdrawal period is pro-" 
vided during which members may withdraw from the union if 
they choose.
6. Preferential Hiring. The employer agrees to hire 
union members if available, but no one need remain a union 
member if he does not wish to.
7. The Agency Shop. The employees must either join 
the union, or, if_they choose not to, pay to the union the 
amount of dues paid by union members.^
State right-to-work laws in general prohibit all forms 
of union security contract provisions.
UNION SECURITY UNDER MERCANTILISTS PHILOSOPHY
The issue of union security or compulsory union member' 
ship has, historically, been of great importance in American
1Union Security, The Case Against the "Right-To-Work1 
Laws. American Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus­
trial Organization?, Washington, D. C., p. 8.
,11
industrial relations. In colonial America, labor's early 
trade associations were dominated by fraternal and humani­
tarian ideals, but as early as 1667 evidence of the closed 
shop and a closed union can be found. For example, Jerome 
L. Toner cites the Berthold Fernow edition of The Records of 
New Amsterdam, from 1653-1674, VI, 292,2 to the effect that 
in 1667 the New York City cartmen demanded and received both 
a closed shop and a closed union in order to protect their 
standards from newcomers, and in 1670 the bakers insisted 
upon and were granted the order that baked bread, rather 
than corn, be shipped to foreign ports in order to extend *
employment in the baking trade. The porters of New York 
City upon complaining to the Mayor's Court that strangers 
were performing their work were granted the exclusive privi­
lege or license to carry all sorts of corn, salt and timber 
within the city.
These organizations for a time received governmental 
support and licenses under the ’mercantiTi'sti'c philosophy of 
the day and this, by including therein labor-management 
relations, added to the increasingly cumbersome task of regu­
lating by governmental force every phase of economic activity.
2Jerome L. Toner, The Closed Shop (Washington: Ameri­
can Council on Public Affairs, 1942), p. 61.
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This was a passing phase however. The rise pf classical 
economic philosophy with its belief in laissez faire, which
was epitomized by Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations in 1776,
}
caused increasing suspicion of government support and licens­
ing arrangements and led to belief in the use of the force of 
competition instead of the force of government as the regu­
lator of all economic activity.
DEVELOPMENT OP UNION SECURITY UNDER LAISSEZ FAIRE
Because the worker was on his own, he turned to self 
help methods, and the union movement as we know it today 
emerged. Alfred Kuhn identifies the first unions (that is, 
continuous associations) as the shoemakers of Philadelphia 
in 1792, the carpenters of Boston in 1793, the shoemakers of 
Boston in 1794, the printers of New York in 1794 and the 
printers of Philadelphia in 1802.
Paul Sultan points out that throughout the history of 
organized labor, interest in the union security issue 
reflects the ever changing power relationship between unions 
and management. The cyclical economic activity created
- 9Alfred Kuhn, Labor Institutions and Economics (New 
York: Rinehard and Company, Inc., 1957), p. 23.
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periods of unemployment for many workers weakening their 
organizing ability and the power relationship varied accord­
ingly.^ Kuhn also calls attention to "rounds" or "waves" 
of union activity and union security interest which he 
identifies with the variations in economic activity, not 
only cyclical, but also in particular regions and in particu­
lar industries. The gains seem to come in periods of in­
creasing economic activity and the losses coincide with periods 
of economic recession.^
In this environment it was learned through experience 
that however attractive and humanitarian the ideal that r'the 
welfare of all depends on the welfare of each" was believed 
to be, this was not the answer. A case in point is the 
history of the Knights of Labor, a widely based and diffused 
organization, which admitted practically every gainfully 
employed person to membership and attempted to better the lot 
of all through broad general reforms, legislation, and attacks 
on monopoly. It was found that this type of organization 
could not concentrate adequately on the particular needs of 
any of its component groups.
4Paul Sultan, Right to Work Laws: A Study in Con­
flict (Los Angeles: University of California, 1958), p. 43.
5Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 24-25.
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Each particular pocket of the labor force found that 
it could serve its own "bread and butter" interests better 
if it could isolate itself from the total competitive 
struggle. In the early days of unionism American production 
was typified by many small enterprises. Mass production 
methods and techniques had not yet developed. Automation 
and job specialization had not yet entered the picture of 
American industry. In this environment it was found that 
skill or trade groups in which each member had the same type 
skill could isolate themselves, pre-empt portions, of the job 
territory, restrict membership, and establish work and pay 
standards. Thus craft unions were the first to be able to 
survive and the closed shop and closed union became time- 
proven ingredients of union security.
In more recent years, with the development of present 
day mass production industries, it was found feasible for 
all employees of a particular plant to belong to the same 
union, regardless of what type of work they did, and in so 
doing to isolate themselves from the general competitive 
struggle much as the earlier craft unions had done. The 
industrial union developed as a result of changing environ­
ment, but union security with its closed shop and closed
6Ibid., pp. 25-35.
15
union remained the same.?
THE PERIOD OP OPPOSITION
The history of public policy toward union security 
may be divided into three parts. The first period runs from 
roughly 1800 to 1932. This was the period beginning with the 
origins of the first real American unions and ending with the 
passage of the Norris LaGuardia Act of 1932. It can properly 
be called the period of opposition.
In a government dedicated to the principle of laissez 
faire, there was no administrative body whose function was 
to deal with labor management problems, nor was it to be 
expected that the legislative branch would enact regulations 
or establish such an administrative body; consequently the 
judicial branch, for the most part, was left to deal with 
the problem. The following footnote from Kuhn is particu­
larly illuminating.
A very substantial portion of English-American law 
consists of rulings made by judges in particular cases, 
rather than rules passed by legislatures. Any judicial 
decision tends to establish a precedent, and in fact 
normally constitutes the law with respect to the situ­
ation0 it covers until a contrary decision is rendered 
in a similar case, or a legislative act creates a new
7Ibid., pp. 35-39
16
rule. The body of precedents thus established con­
stitutes the common law, or judge-made law, and 
judges tend to follow these precedents until there 
arises some compelling reason to deviate from them.
When a new kind of case arises, covered by neither 
legislation nor closely related precedent, the 
judge will normally seek guidance in either a parallel 
relationship from a different field, or in some gen­
eral principle of law.8
This explains how under laissez faire the legal 
machinery is capable of enforcing— and extending— the law to 
deal with such problems as may arise.
Because of the new economic philosophy based on the 
belief in the existence and regulatory power of competition, 
it was the opinion of the day that wages were set by the 
market, that unions could only distort proper relationships, 
and that unions which made competition imperfect reduced the 
efficiency of competition as the automatic regulatory 
mechanism; consequently unions were dealt with as an evil by 
the courts. The common law doctrine of conspiracy was in­
voked against union action.
The essence of the conspiracy doctrine is that what 
is legal for one person to do alone becomes an illegal con­
spiracy if several persons join together for the same purpose. 
It is not the purpose of the joining together which is
8Ibid., p. 261.
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important, but rather the joining together which is the of­
fense. Thus all conspiracies are illegal though the subject 
matter of them may be lawful. The application of the doc­
trine made it easy to convict and fine union members. Al­
though the courts gradually changed toward the end of the 
period and began to look at the aims and methods of the con­
spiracy, the doctrine of conspiracy was persistent, recurring
ias a partial basis of decisions to the close of the period.
Sometime in the 1880's employers began the use of the 
labor injunction, which they found a more effective method, 
and the use of the conspiracy doctrine declined. The injunc­
tion was more effective because a temporary injunction could 
be obtained upon an application by the employer without the 
union being heard. This is what is called an ex parte order. 
It also had the advantage of being available before the union 
action took place or "before the fact" whereas the conspiracy 
doctrine was only available "after the fact." Thus it was 
able to "put out the fire before it got started." Finally, 
a violation of the injunction resulted in contempt of court 
proceedings in which the penalties could be greater than the 
fines prescribed under the conspiracy doctrine.
Congress gave the courts an important new basis for 
the use of the injunction with the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of
1890. The leading case is that of Loewe v. Lawlor in which 
the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Sherman 
Act made every contract, combination, or conspiracy in re-
Qstraint of trade illegal whether business, farmer or labor.
It is significant that twelve of the first thirteen cases 
brought under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act were to prevent 
actions by unions.^® Just how broad the injunctions became 
is illustrated in the Pullman strike in 1894 in which the
court enjoined the union, its officers, and all other persons
whomsoever from in any way or manner interfering with the 
business of the railroads entering Chicago, carrying United 
States mail, or engaging in interstate commerce; or compel­
ling or inducing, or attempting to compel or induce by 
threats, intimidation, persuasion, force or violence, any of 
the employees to refuse or fail to perform any of their 
duties as employees.^  The substance of the injunction was 
that no one was allowed to strike or in any way, directly or 
indirectly, to assist the strike.
^Loewe v . Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908) 52 L. ed. p.
488. .
^Edward Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (New York; 
Harper & Brothers, 1930), p. 3.
n In re Debs, 64 Fed. 724. (1893),(p? 7*6.
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The Clayton Act of 1914 is believed by some to be an 
attempt to restrain judges in their continued application of 
the Sherman Act because it contained the following provisions.
Section 6: That the labor of a human is not a
commodity. Nothing contained in the anti-trust 
laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and 
operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural 
organizations, or to forbid or restrain individual 
members of such organizations from lawfully carrying 
out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such 
organizations, or the members thereof be held or con­
strued to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in 
restraint of trade under the anti-trust laws.
Section 20: (The last paragraph) And no such
restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any 
person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from 
terminating any relation of employment, or from 
ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recom­
mending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful 
means so to do; or from attending at any place where 
any such person or persons may lawfully be, for the 
purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating 
information, or from peacefully persuading any person’ 
to work or to abstain from working; or from ceasing 
to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, 
or from recommending, advising, or persuading others 
by peaceful and lawful means so to do; from paying or 
giving to, or withholding from, any person engaged in 
such dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or 
things of value; or from peacefully assembling in a 
lawful manner, and for lawful purposes; or from doing 
any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the 
absence of such dispute by any party thereto; nor 
shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be 
considered to be violations of any law of the United 
States.
The Clayton Act failed to restrain judges in their 
continued application of the Sherman Act to union activity.
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In cases defended under the Clayton Act, of which the Duplex
1 0Printing Press Co. v. Peering 16 is a leading case, the 
Supreme Court said in effect that the Clayton Act covered 
only peaceful activity of unions, that since the courts had 
never prohibited peaceful activities, the Clayton Act had 
changed nothing, and that the courts would continue under 
their existing precedents.13 This then was the effective 
governmental policy under the social philosophy existing- 
during the period of opposition.
With the coming of the Great Depression, there arose, 
out of the reality of labor's helplessness anckthe indignity 
labor faced in its competitive struggle for subsistence, a 
shift in public support from employer to employee. The 
public believed it could no longer endorse unregulated com­
petition in a labor market characterized by mass unemploy­
ment. The economic philosophy emphasizing the pervasiveness 
of monopoly was epitomized by such works as Chamberlin1s 
The Theory of Monopolistic Competition.
1 9Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Peering, 254 U.S. 443
(1920).
13Kuhn, o£. cit., p. 267.
^Edward Hastings Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolis­
tic Competition (seventh ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1960).
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The belief grew that the labor market was at least 
monopsbnisiic,and that the removal of competition among 
workers would somehow improve it. The end of the period of 
opposition was at hand.
THE PERIOD OF PROTECTION
The second period in the history of public policy 
toward union security runs from 1932 to 1947. It begins 
with the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, officially 
the Anti-Injunction Act, and ends with the passage of the 
Taft-Hartley Act, officially the Labor Management Relations 
Act of 1947.
The official governmental policy is stated in Section 
2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.-*-'’
Whereas under prevailing conditions, developed 
with the aid of governmental authority for owners 
of property to organize in the corporate and other 
forms of ownership associations, the individual 
worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual 
liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of 
labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and 
conditions of employment, wherefore, though he 
should be free to decline to associate with his‘ 
fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom 
of association with his fellows, it is necessary 
that he have full freedom of association, selfw 
organization, and designation of representatives
•*-̂The Anti-Injunction Act, 47 Stat. 70.
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of his own choosing/ to negotiate the terms and 
conditions of his employment, and that he shall 
be free from the interference, restraint, or 
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, 
in the designation of such representatives or in 
self organization or in other connected activities 
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection: Therefore the following
. . . are hereby enacted.
The Act contained provisions which limited drastically 
the conditions under which injunctions could be issued by 
Federal courts. The law does not actually put the govern­
ment on the side of unions, but it may be considered pro­
labor in that it stops the government's active assistance to 
employers in their fight against unions.
In this official statement of policy can be clearly
seen the recognition that the labor market is monopsonistic,
but there is still an endorsement of competition as the norm
in the Machlupian sense. "The most effective kind of action
government can take against monopoly is to stop intervening
16against competition."
There is a clear departure from this economic philoso­
phy in the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA) 
and the Wagner Act of 1935, officially the National Labor
•^Fritz Machlup, The Political—Economy of Monopoly 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1952), p. 183.
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Relations Act, which followed. These laws reflect the aban­
donment of competition as a norm in the sale of labor service 
because it is not a reality in the purchase of labor.
The purpose of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
was to block the downward spiral of wages and prices through 
codes of fair competition, and it encouraged unionization as 
a part of the effort to stabilize wages. ^  The Wagner Act 
contained one central idea that was stated in Section 7-a:
Employees shall have the right to self-organiza­
tion, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, 
to bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activi­
ties, for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection.
It also contained six provisions of basic importance 
to the union security issue:
1. It provided specifically that it was an unfair 
labor practice for employers to discriminate against 
employees for organizing, bargaining, or engaging in 
other forms of protected union activity.
2. It established the majority rule principle 
under which a union certified as the bargaining agent 
for a predetermined unit became the exclusive repre­
sentative of all employees in that unit.
3. Employees were given the right to form, join, 
or assist labor organizations, and to bargain col­
lectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, although no mention was made of their right 
not to join.
^7Kuhn, op. cit., p. 273.
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4. It explicitly made the closed shop and other 
forms of union security legal where negotiated by 
the representatives of the majority of the employees.
5. It provided a satisfactory mechanism for 
determining the employees' choice of bargaining 
representative.
6. A National Labor Relations Board was establish­
ed to enforce the law.
Thus the Act not only permitted workers to join unions 
(although not giving positive assistance to the unions or 
their organization attempts), but it‘ protected that permis­
sion against employers' attempts to destroy or nullify it.-*-8
These laws do more than reflect a change in the 
laissez faire attitude of the government toward union 
security. What is called bargaining power in this context 
is nothing less than monopoly or monopsony power. The 
government, having found that inequality in bargaining power 
existed, undertook to compensate for the limitations on em­
ployers' competition for labor, and for the monopsony power 
which it implies, by measures limiting workers' competition 
for jobs and creating monopoly power on the part of l a b o r . '
Under an administration sympathetic to labor, the 
Wagner Act, by preventing employers from stopping workers 
from joining unions, enabled mass-based unions to grow from
3-8Ibid. , p. 275. 19Machlup, op. cit., p. 325.
weaklings in need of protection to powerful organizations 
no longer in need of support to survive. As Sultan puts it:
Society revealed the ambivalence of its values 
by paying ideological homage to individualism and 
competition while simultaneously becoming enmeshed 
in the organization of economic power blocks.20
The period following the Wagner Act was marked by 
several developments and crises which shifted the power 
balance between employers and unions and gave impetus to 
furthet legislation in the union security field.
Questions of democracy arose. Do unions inject democ­
racy into industry by giving effect to the voice of the indi­
vidual? Are unions, as power centers, less aptocratic than 
management in dealing with employees? How/about the concept 
called industrial citizenship in which plan)t government is 
seen as similar to public government, being a government of 
laws, not of men? If plant government is to be democratic, 
does this impose any duty on the worker as an industrial 
citizen not only to elect his representatives, but to support 
the process with his ideas and money? • Can union democracy 
thrive when the members can abdicate their citizenship? Can 
union leadership remain sensitive to the rank and file only 
when the majority rule prevails? What happens when
20sultan, op. cit., p. 3.
unsatisfied, disgruntled individuals can make union security 
a factor in urging support of "irresponsible" union action 
by threatening to resign their membership?
, Problems in the use of power also arose. The period 
immediately following World War II was marked with an un­
precedented high of 14.5 per cent of the labor force being 
involved in strikes in 1946. The post war inflation prob­
lems and the wage-price spirals led to the blaming of unions 
for price instability. The Wagner Act gave no protection to 
the employer, the public, or even the employees themselves 
in a fight between two unions, and although it protected an 
employee from an employer in choosing a bargaining agent, it 
gave him no protection from rival unions. It required the 
employer to bargain, but had no provisions for a union refus­
ing to bargain, nor did it contain any relief for workers
caught in the control of a dictatorial union.
Under these circumstances some labor leaders, having 
developed greater skill in gaining power than in its wisei
use, created abuses. If a union had the economic power to
secure a closed shop and the legal right to close its
"private club" to new members, the monopoly implications 
were self evident. These developments led to the public 
image of unions disregarding the public welfare and the need
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for public regulation and control of union power.
The dynamics of the total social environment entered 
into the problem. The post-war trend to suburban living, 
changes in social and* political orientation, and the rise of 
individualism as a new social ethic baused a spatial separa­
tion of employee from employee and from union hall. These 
changes gave the worker additional interests and activities, 
such as television, evening shopping, do-it-yourself pro­
jects, and commuting problems, all of which claimed his time 
and energy. Thus any tendency the worker may have had to be
the "abstract mass in the grip of an abstract force" was 
91reduced. A
After the return to full employment following the 
Great Depression, employers were no longer on the defensive. 
The"economic system seemed to be working better. In a period 
of labor shortage, individual bargaining power was at an all 
time high. To the general public, employers and industry 
seemed more trustworthy and unions less necessary. The 
absence of the problems of unemployment and economic hardship 
removed much of the cohesive force which made workers insist 
on the "common rule" and made them more willing to risk it
21Ibid., pp. 6-11.
alone. The period of protection came to an end.
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THE MIXED PERIOD
The current period in the history of public policy 
toward union security may properly be called the mixed period. 
Its beginning is marked by the passage of the Taft-Hartley 
Act, officially, the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 
amending the Wagner Act.
Because abuses did exist under the umbrella protection 
of union security arrangements, Congress, in enacting a re­
form measure, had the choice of either opening the shop (this 
involved the restriction of all forms of union security 
arrangements) or opening the union (this involved regulating 
the admission and expulsion policies of the union). Con­
gress in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act attempted to move in
22each direction.
First, the closed shop was forbidden.
Second, discriminatory hiring halls and preferential 
hiring treatment to union members were forbidden.
Third, an election was provided for, where union shop 
provisions were to be negotiated. This provision was
22Ibid., p. 49.
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abolished in 1951 because during the four years it was in 
effect, 97 per cent of the elections resulted in authoriza­
tion of the negotiation of union shop agreements.
Fourth, the union could require that the employer dis­
charge an employee under a union shop agreement only on two 
conditions: (1) failure of the employee to tender the regu­
larly required initiation fee; and (2) failure of the employee 
to tender the regularly required dues. In addition, provision 
was made for deauthorizing an existing union shop agreement.
Finally, section 14(b) of the Act permitted states to 
enact legislation restricting union security arrangements 
more than the federal law did. Section 14(b) reads:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authoriz­
ing the execution or application of agreements re­
quiring membership in a labor organization as a con­
dition of employment in any State or Territory in 
which such execution or application is prohibited by 
State or Territorial law.
This made possible the present right-to-work controversy at
the state level.
Since Florida adopted the first right-to-work law more
than eighteen years ago, some of the more heated arguments in
\
industrial relations have concerned the right-to-work laws 
which are now in effect in nineteen states. (See Table I.) 
Attempts are still being made to pass right-to-work
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TABLE I













North Carolina March, 1947
North Dakota June, 1948
South Carolina March, 1954





aInoperative until approved by referendum, 1948.
i.Act approved February, 1947.
cAct approved June, 1947.
^Act approved March, 1947.
Source: Union Security, The Case Against the "Right 
to Work" Laws. American Federation of Labor and Congress 
of Industrial Organizations, Washington, D. C., pp. 29-30 
and addendum, p. 39.
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laws in other states. Vigorous campaigns were conducted in 
Oklahoma, Wyoming, Maine and Pennsylvania in 1962. Cam­
paigns have also been conducted in states which rejected the 
right-to-work laws. Examples of states in which the laws 
failed to pass in 1958 are Ohio, Washington, Colorado, Idaho, 
and California. New Hampshire and Delaware adopted right-to- 
work laws in 1947 only to repeal them in 1949, two years 
later. Louisiana, which originally adopted a general law in 
1954, repealed it two years later in 1956 and replaced it 
with a law covering agricultural workers only.
X
It is interesting to note that those states which have 
passed right-to-work laws are largely agricultural, and that 
campaigns in more industrialized states have not resulted in 
the passage of the laws. This is not inconsistent with the 
findings of a survey by the American Institute of Public 
Opinion, that although only one out of three non-union voters 
has heard of right-to-work laws, two out of three of these 
people said they would vote for such legislation when its 
purpose was explained to them; while on the other hand, 82 
per cent of union members were familiar with such legislation, 
and two out of three of these people said they would vote 
against it.22
23Institute of Public Opinion Release, August 6, 8,
1957.
SUMMARY
In this chapter right-to-work laws were identified in 
terms of opposition to union security agreements. An inter­
pretation of the history of public policy toward union 
security in this country was then given.
The history of public policy toward union security 
was inserted into this study to indicate the underlying 
reasons behind the inclusion of Section 14(b) in the Taft- 
Hartley Act. The theory was developed that, in the final 
analysis, the study of the right-to-work controversy is a 
study of the competitive struggle for power between labor 
and management and that the role of government in that 
struggle is a serious complicating factor.
It was pointed out that, in the infancy of indus­
trialism, labor-management relations were regulated under 
mercantilistic philosophy. It was shown that during the 
period of opposition, the government, although endorsing 
laissez faire, intervened on the side of management; that 
during the period of protection, the government recognized 
that the labor market was imperfect and intervened on the 
side of unions in an attempt to create a balance of power; 
and that during the mixed period the weight of government 
was withdrawn somewhat from the union side in an attempt to
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correct an over-balance and place employer, employee and
union on a more equitable basis.
Truly the task of finding substitutes for com­
petition as the regulator of economic life has 
proven to be enormous indeed.24
a-
2^Sultan> op. cit., p. 3
CHAPTER III
RIGHT-TO-WORK CAMPAIGN ARGUMENTS
A "CORRECT" SOLUTION MAY NOT NECESSARILY BE POUND
Although the right-to-work arguments often generate 
more heat than light, it should be useful to examine some 
of the more important arguments, both for and against thei
laws, to bring order out of chaos. In considering these 
arguments it is well to bear in mind that a "correct" answer 
may not be found, and it is important to understand why this 
is so.
CONFLICTING PHILOSOPHIES AND RIGHT-TO-WORK
The arguments involve labor economics, industrial 
sociology, state and federal politics, and constitutional
I
law. In addition to this, the state campaigns sometimes
have taken on the appearance of a holy crusade, and often
1 1 pure emotionalism transcends both reason and morality.
■^Paul Sultan, Right To Work Laws: A Study in Conflict
(Los Angeles: University of California, 1958), p. 1.
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The philosophies of these fields do not necessarily lead to 
the same conclusion. For example, when we attempt to analyze 
the arguments advanced for and against right-to-work laws we 
must consider that we are confronted with two standards by 
which to judge their merits— those of our political philoso­
phy, and those of our economic philosophy. Policy in the 
political forum under our system is determined in an entirely 
different way than prices and wages in the economic forum.
By a political democracy, we mean that each person, no matter 
how important or humble, shall have but one vote, and each 
one has the egalitarian ideal that he has an equal voice in 
shaping political policy. In the economic market the voice 
of the individual is a function of the control he has over 
society's resources and income, and there is no egalitarian 
ideal.
If we are going to apply our principles of political 
democracy to industry to form an industrial democracy, we 
must reorganize our existing economic organization because 
industrial democracy in the sense of complete equality of 
influence and power is not to be found in the framework of 
orthodox economic theory.2
2Ibid. , p. 111.
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DUNLOP'S INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM
In this connection, the concept of an industrial rela­
tions system as developed by John T. Dunlop should aid in 
visualizing two of the arenas in which the right-to-work 
conflicts are waged. Dunlop points out that the economic 
system can be regarded as a subsystem of the more general 
total social system. In addition/ industrial society, what­
ever its political form, creates distinctive groups of work­
ers and managers and their organizations are formally 
arranged in the industrial society outside the family and 
distinct from the political institutions, although the family 
and political institutions may in fact be used to shape or 
control relations between managers and workers at the indus­
trial work place. Dunlop calls this arrangement an indus­
trial relations system and views it as an analytical sub­
system of the total social system. He regards the economic 
system as another analytical subsystem of the total social 
system. His industrial relations system is not a subsidiary 
part of the economic system, but is rather a separate and 
distinctive subsystem of the society, coexistent with the V
3economic system. The interrelations of these two subsystems
•^John T. Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958), pp. 1-7.
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with each other and with the total social system is part of 
the problem of union security.
MULTIPLE PARTIES AND RIGHT-TO-WORK
Another somewhat more frequently recognized part of 
the problem of union security is the fact that there are at 
least four parties at interest involved— the individual, 
management, the union, and society at large. There are many 
ways in which these parties may find that their interests 
conflict. The following is an incomplete list of some of 
the ways the parties might line up on any particular point: 
(1) management versus union; (2) union versus employee; (3) 
employee versus management; (4) management versus union and 
employee; (5) union versus management and employee; (6) 
employee versus management and union; (7) management, union 
and employee versus public interest; and (8) the interests 
of all parties coincide.
"PURSUIT AND ESCAPE" BY CLARK KERR
An informative view of the right-to-work conflict can 
be gained by inserting it into an amusing little melodrama 
written by Clark Kerr.
Unionism is engaged in a grand pursuit— a pursuit 
mainly of the employer. And the employer is always
38
trying, with more or less success, to escape.
Now X do not wish to conjure up a picture of 
poor Eliza being chased across the ice by 
bloodhounds. Our Eliza is by no means always 
poor; nor do the bloodhounds always pursue very 
aggressively (they are often quite gentle 
creatures). They may even agree to stay a cer­
tain distance behind her, or to care for and 
protect her if she will be nice to them, or they 
may arrange for better ice so that both Eliza and 
they can run faster. However, they may also try 
to get somebody else to hold Eliza one way or 
another so that they can catch up with her, which 
does not, offhand, sound very fair, though it may 
be quite effective. And, in our little drama 
Eliza does not always get across the river in 
time, although she usually does remarkably well 
and at times turns around and chases the blood­
hounds back again [sometimes even trying to get 
somebody else to hold the bloodhounds one way or 
another for her]. Beyond that, the bloodhounds 
sometimes catch somebody else while chasing Eliza.
They may even,, inadvertently, catch themselves.
In the extreme case, they may liquidate Eliza and 
start chasing each other, and this can turn out to 
be the bloodiest drama of all.4
The attempt by employers to get the government to 
hold back the unions was inserted into Kerr's melodrama, and 
it is this attempt that is the subject of this chapter.
POLITICAL PROCESS IS NECESSARY
If management is to get the government to hold union­
ism for it by outlawing union security, it will have to
^Clark Kerr, "Labor's Income Share and the Labor Move­
ment," New Concepts in Wage Determination (George W. Taylor 
and Prank C. Pierson, eds. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
Inc., 1957), p. 269.
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resort to legislation and the political process. The his­
torical brief of public policy set forth in Chapter II was 
developed to show that in the early mercantilistic times 
the government entered fully into the labor management rela­
tions field, but that under classical philosophy and laissez 
faire, the government withdrew in general from active regula­
tion. It was shown, however, that management had been 
successful, through the judicial system, in getting the 
government to hold back unionism in the period of opposition. 
It was further shown that in the period of protection, union­
ism had succeeded in getting legislation passed which not 
only stopped the courts from holding unionism back, but also 
put the government on unionism's side in holding back manage­
ment. This legislation will have to be changed if there is 
to be any loosening of the government1s hold on management 
or tightening of government's hold on unionism. In the mixed 
period it was shown, that management succeeded, to some ex­
tent, in getting government to take some of the slack out of 
its hold on unionism. Any further tightening of the govern­
ment's hold on unionism will require additional legislation, 
a political process. Right-to-work laws are an example of 
such legislation.
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SOURCE OP SUPPORT FOR RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS
Because the enactment of the right-to-work legisla­
tion is a political process, the support of voters (or their 
representatives) is necessary. This includes not only those 
who are sympathetic to management, but also any and all 
voters (or representatives) who for any reason whatsoever can 
be persuaded to support the right-to-work movement. A 
dichotomy of sorts can be identified in the arguments pro and 
con in the right-to-work debate. By way of illustrating this 
dichotomy the views of two students of the right-to-work de­
bate are given below.
View of R. L. Frederick
R. L 0 Frederick in his thesis concludes that the main 
purpose of the right-to-work laws is the protection of the 
individual. In discussing the reasons for including section 
14(b) in the Taft-Hartley Act, Frederick quotes T. R. Iserman, 
who, he says, summed up the objective of the Federal law very 
well before the Semi-Annual Meeting of the Academy of Politi­
cal Science on April 21, 1954, as follows:
I think what motivated Congress more than anything 
else in amending the Wagner Act by passing the Taft- 
Hartley Act and limiting the union shop was the belief 
that employers and unions have no right, by agreement 
between themselves, to limit the opportunity of people
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to get jobs and hold jobs to those who are members 
of unions . . . the purpose was to protect the 
individual working man and not to protect employers.^
Frederick follows his discussion of the Federal legis­
lation with a discussion of the state right-to-work laws 
passed pursuant to the permission granted in the Taft-Hartley 
Act, Section 14(b). He examines each law, word for word, and 
quotes excerpts from the policy statements contained in all 
the right-to-work laws that had been passed at that time, 
all of which are similar to that statement of policy which 
in the Texas law is the most brief: "No person shall be
denied employment on account of membership or non-membership
£in a labor union." He concludes:
The primary objective desired through the passage 
of Right-To-Work laws was, as noted previously, the 
desire to protect the right to work of both union and 
non-union members. Two by-product aims of these laws 
were (1) to improve labor relations and collective 
bargaining in the state, and (2) to encourage indus­
trial growth in the state.^
^R. L o Frederick, "The Effect of Right-to-Work Laws 
Upon Industrial Growth" (unpublished Master's thesis,
School of Industrial Management, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 1956), p. 15.
^Statutes of Texas, Art. 5207A, Section 2.
7Frederick, op. cit., p. 30.
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View of Paul Sultan
The second view emphasizes the management versus union 
conflict and is voiced by Paul Sultan, who says:
It is sometimes contended that the right-to-work 
legislation is not actually a contest between unions 
and management, but one between labor and labor 
bosses. . . . Although it is true that this is an 
issue involving union-employee relations, it is 
certainly much more a contest between unions and 
management.®
THE PROPONENTS AND OPPONENTS CONSIDERED
A list of some of the major proponents and opponents
of the right-to-work laws would seem to support Sultan's 
opinion. Among the proponents are the National Association 
of Manufacturers, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and 
Associated Industries, all of which are supported by industry 
and business in general. No representative of organized 
labor is to be found among the proponents. Among the op­
ponents are the AFL-CIO, the United Mine Workers, and other
representatives of organized labor. No business organiza­
tion claiming to represent the interest of industry or 
business in general is to be found among the opponents.
The right-to-work issue certainly is in part a contest 
between unions and management. In the discussion which
QSultan, op. cit., p. 63.
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follows, the relative importance of this part of the contest 
in tHe right-to-work controversy is indicated.
ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS OF RIGHT-TO-WORK 
LAWS CONSIDERED
An analytical look at the right-to-work statutes will 
disclose, in addition to their statement of public policy, 
the following facts. (See Table II.)
In the nineteen states where these laws are now in 
effect, five are statements of policy only and contain no 
provision for any kind of enforcement. It must be admitted 
that common law remedies and injunctive relief might be 
available to complainants, but the laws themselves merely 
make union security provisions unenforceable.
Only eight states provide for the recovery of damages 
to those injured by violaters of the laws. Of these eight, 
three permitted the injured party to recover reasonable 
attorney's fees as well as damages. Only six laws contain 
a provision for injunctive relief against violaters.
Finally, only eleven of these laws contain a criminal 
provision making it a misdemeanor to violate them. Of these 
last eleven, three provide no penalties for those found 
guilty, three provide for fines, and five provide for both
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TABLE II
ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS IN NINETEEN STATES' 
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS
State None Attor- Damages ney pee Injunc­tion Misdemeanor
Alabama X
Arizona Yes Yes Yes-no penalty
Arkansas Yes-fine
Florida X
Georgia Yes Yes Yes Yes-fine & jail
Indiana Yes Yes Yes-fine & jail







S.Carolina Yes Yes Yes Yes-fine & jail
S. Dakota Yes-fine & jail
Tennessee Yes-fine & jail
Texas X




5 8 3 6 11-3 no penalty 
3 fine only 
5 fine & jail
Source: Texts of State Right-To-Work Laws.
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fines and jail sentences. In no case was any administrative 
or enforcement machinery created that in any way compared to 
the National Labor Relations Board. The initiative and bur­
den of protecting and enforcing any rights conferred by 
these laws lies entirely with the "protected" individual.
Not many workmen find it practical to spend the time, 
money, and effort in initiating and carrying forward the 
litigation that is required under these circumstances in an 
attempt to enforce their right to a particular job, from 
which they may be dismissed at any time for some reason
v
other than non-membership in a union, and in the prodess 
alienate both their employer and the union.
There are some employers, however, who have a big 
enough stake in the result of such litigation that they find 
it worth while to take the initiative and burden of such an 
action. It is concluded that, as a practical matter, en­
forcement of rights created under the right-to-work laws is 
available only to some business organizations and not to 
individual workmen. This lends support to the argument that 
the right-to-work controversy is more of a management versus 
union issue than a labor versus union bosses issue.
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OTHER SOCIAL LEGISLATION CONSIDERED
One of the principle arguments used as a justifica­
tion for support of right-to-work legislation by the pro­
ponents, is that they are concerned with the welfare of the 
individual and that they favor the adoption of right-to-work 
laws by the state as social legislation expressing that con­
cern. The opponents, particularly the labor unions, reply 
that if concern for the individual is really of such concern 
in a state so as to cause the passage of right-to-work laws 
as an expression of that concern, then it is reasonable to 
expect (1) that the state would provide other social legis­
lation in addition to a right-to-work law for the protection 
and benefit of its working residents, such as unemployment 
insurance and workmen's compensation, and (2) that this 
protection would be on a par, at least, with similar protec­
tion provided by other states for their residents.
They then present statistics tending to show defici­
encies in unemployment insurance and workmen's compensation 
provisions in right-to-work states as proof of the insin­
cerity of those using the social legislation argument.^
The position of both sides of this argument depend on
Q?Union Security, op. cit., p. 132.
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a value judgment that the social legislation they have in 
mind does in fact protect and benefit the individual; how­
ever, the validity of this social legislation argument can 
be examined without going into the merits of social legis­
lation.
Unemployment Insurance
The United States Department of Labor has compiled 
comparisons of the provisions for unemployment insurance 
contained in the various states1 laws and of the states' 
experiences thereunder. Of these, the AFL-CIO has used the 
"comparison of the maximum number of weeks [of unemployment 
compensation] provided for in case of total unemployment,"10 
and the "comparison of the maximum weekly benefit payment" 
[provided by the various states],11 to cast doubt upon the
allegation that right-to-work laws are an expression of
12 •genuine concern for the individual worker.
The first, the "comparison of the maximum number of 
weeks" as of November, 1961, shows that the most frequently 
provided maximum time duration is twenty-six weeks.
10United States Bureau of Employment Security, Com­
parison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws as of January 
It 1961. BES No. U-141, pp. 76, 79.
11Ibid. ^Union Security, loc. cit.
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Thirty-six states provide for this duration. Of these 
thirty-six states, six provide for extensions at high levels 
of unemployment. Only one of the six is a right-to-work 
state. There are nine states which provide a maximum time 
in excess of twenty-six weeks and only one of these is a 
right-to-work state. There are six states which provide 
less than twenty-six weeks and all of these six are right- 
to-work states.
The second, the "comparison of the maximum weekly 
benefit" as of November, 1961, shows that the average maxi­
mum weekly benefit payment for the United States was $41.70. 
Only four of the right-to-work states exceeded that average 
while fifteen right-to-work states were below it.
In evaluating the meaning of these comparisons, it 
must be remembered that they are comparisons of the wording 
or absolute provisions of the laws and as such do not 
measure how well each particular state^provides for the need 
of its resident workers. A state's unemployment experience 
may indicate a need to provide for only a short period of 
time. If so, failure to provide for a longer time would not 
be a deficiency. Further, it should be realized that the 
amount of the maximum weekly benefit payment is related to 
the state's per capita income and that a low maximum for
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weekly benefit payments may not reflect a failure to pro­
vide a substitute income, but rather may simply reflect a 
low per capita income. The above two comparisons cannot be 
accepted as measures of the sufficiency of the particular 
state's unemployment compensation provisions in meeting the 
needs of the state's unemployed residents.
For a measurement of how the need is met in each 
particular state, the experience of each state under its law 
should be compared with the experience of other states.
There are two comparisons compiled by the United States 
Department of Labor which do this. They are: "Comparison 
of State Experience Under Unemployment Insurance Laws; Per 
Cent of Claimants Exhausting Benefit Rights for Total State 
Programs/'^and "Comparison of State Experience Under Unem­
ployment Insurance Laws: Average Weekly Payment for Total
Unemployment Related to Average Weekly Covered Wage Includ­
ing Dependents' Allowances."1^
Under the first comparison, which is shown as of 1960 
in Table III, the sufficiency of the time duration is tested.
^Bureau of Employment Security, Exhaustion of Unem­
ployment Benefit Rights, BES No. U-202, June, 1961.
^Bureau of Employment Security, Unemployment Insur­





COMPARISON OF STATE EXPERIENCE UNDER UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
LAWS. PER CENT OF CLAIMANTS EXHAUSTING BENEFIT 
RIGHTS FOR TOTAL STATE PROGRAMS t 1960
State Per Cent Exhausted State
Per Cent 
Exhausted
Alabama3 45.5 West Virginia 26.2
Louisiana 44.7 California 25.9
Virginia3 43.1 Minnesota 25.6
Texas3 40.6 Kansas3 25.2
Florida3 39.6 Rhode Island 24.8
Georgia3 39.0 Idaho 24.7
Wisconsin 36.9 Nevada3 24.4
District of Columbia 36.2 Nebraska3 24.2
Tennessee3 36.1 Michigan 22.9
Indiana3 35.8 Massachusetts 22.7
South Carolina3 35.5 Ohio 22.5
Connecticut 33.1 Utah'3 22.2
South Dakota3 31.7 Oregon 21.6
Oklahoma 30.9 New Mexico 21.3
New Jersey 30.5 Pennsylvania 21.0
Delaware 30.3 Vermont 20.7
Kentucky 30.3 Washington 20.4
Illinois 29.9 Colorado 19.9
Mississippi3 29.7 Missouri 19.5
Iowa3 28.6 Arizona3 19.4
Arkansas3 28.4 Maine 18.8
Montana 27.5 North Carolina3 18.6
United States 27.3 North Dakota3 17.9
Wyoming 26.7 New York 17.3
Maryland 26.4 New Hampshire 13.2
Alaska 26.3 Hawaii 9.0
aRight-to-work states.
Source: Bureau of Employment Security, Exhaustion of
Unemployment Benefit Rights, BES No. U-202, June, 1961.
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If the per cent of claimants exhausting their benefit rights 
is greater in one state than another, it.is an indication 
that the benefits are not as adequate in that state. Table 
III shows that for the total state unemployment insurance 
programs, the national average of the percentage of claim­
ants exhausting their rights was 27.3 per cent. In twelve 
of the right-to-work states the percentage of claimants who 
exhausted their rights was above the national average while 
in only seven of the right-to-work states the percentage of 
claimants who exhausted their rights was below that average. 
The right-to-work states taken as a whole and using this 
measure are slightly deficient in comparison to the national 
average7 but not to the extent indicated by the APL-CIO.
Under the second comparison/ which is shown in Table 
IV, the adequacy of the money payment is tested. If the 
average weekly benefit payment is a greater percentage of the 
average weekly covered wage in one state than in another it 
is an indication that that state is providing a more adequate 
substitute income than the other for its unemployed residents. 
Table IV shows that the national average of the percentages 
of the average weekly wage covered by unemployment insurance 
is 36 per cent. Nine of the right-to-work states paid rela­
tive benefits equal to or in excess of this national average
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TABLE IV
COMPARISON OP STATE EXPERIENCE UNDER UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
LAWS. AVERAGE WEEKLY PAYMENT FOR TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
(CALENDAR YEAR 1960) RELATED TO AVERAGE WEEKLY 
COVERED WAGE (CALENDAR YEAR 1959)
INCLUDING DEPENDENTS' ALLOWANCES
State Per Cent State Per Cent
Wyoming 47 United States 36
Idaho 44 Florida3 35
Hawaii 43 Georgia3 35
Massachusetts 43 Pennsylvania 35
Colorado 42 Arizona3 34
Ohio 42 Delaware 34
Kansas3 41 Illinois 34
Wisconsin 41 Michigan 34
Utah3 40 Montana 34
California . 39 New Mexico 34'
Nevada3 39 . South Carolina3 34
Oregon 39 Washington 34
South Dakota3 39 Minnesota 33
Connecticut 38 New Jersey 33
Nebraska3 38 Indiana3 32
North Dakota3 38 Missouri 32
Rhode Island 38 Oklahoma 32
Louisiana 37 Virginia3 32
Maryland 37 Alabama3 31
Mississippi3 37 North Carolina3 31
Arkansas3 36 Tennessee3 31
Iowa3 36 District of Columbia 29
Kentucky 36 , Maine 29
New Hampshire 36 Texas3 29
New York 36 Alaska 27
Vermont 36 West Virginia 26
aRight-to-work states.
Source: Bureau of Employment Security, Unemployment
Insurance: State Laws and Experiences, BES No. U-198, April,
1961.
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while ten of the right-to-work states fell below. If the 
right-to-work states are taken as a whole, they seem to meet 
this need about on a par with the national average, a fact 
which is not apparent from a comparison of the maximum 
weekly dollar provisions of the law alone.
Workmen1s Compensation
The United States Department of Labor has also com­
piled comparisons of the provisions for workmen's compensa­
tion contained in the various states1 laws and of the states' 
experiences thereunder. The AFL-CIO has used one of these 
comparisons: "The comparison of the maximum weekly benefit
amount for temporary total disability [provided by the 
various states] ,1,15 to demonstrate lack of true concern for 
the welfare of resident workers in right-to-work states and 
to cast doubt upon the allegation that right-to-work laws 
are social legislation expressing that concern.16
As of December, 1961, this comparison shows that only 
three of the right-to-work states provide maximum amounts in 
excess of the national average and that sixteen right-to-work
15Bureau of Labor Standards, State Workmen1s Compensa­
tion Laws: A Comparison of Major Provisions with Recommended
Standards; Bulletin No. 212, revised, December, 1961.
^Union Security, loc. cit.
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states provide less than that average.
In this case, as well as the case of the unemployment 
insurance discussion above, the maximum dollar amounts pro­
vided reflect per capita income and a low maximum weekly 
benefit provision may only reflect a low per capita income 
and not failure to meet a need. This comparison cannot be 
accepted as a measure of the sufficiency of a particular 
state's workmen's compensation provisions in meeting the 
needs of the state's disabled workers.
The adequacy of the money payment should be tested 
by relating the maximum weekly total temporary disability 
benefits to the weekly average wage. This would then indi­
cate how well the state has provided for a substitute income 
to the disabled workman. The Department of Labor has com­
piled such a comparison entitled "Comparison of State 
Experience Under Workmen's Compensation Laws. Ratio of 
Maximum Weekly Total Temporary Disability Benefits for 
Worker with Wife and Two Dependents, to the Weekly Average 
Covered Wage."1^
In using this comparison which is shown as of December, 
1961, in Table V, it should be noted first that the median
■^Bulletin No. 212, ojo. cit.
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TABLE V
COMPARISON OF STATE EXPERIENCE UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
LAWS. RATIO OF MAXIMUM WEEKLY TOTAL TEMPORARY DISABILITY 
BENEFITS FOR WORKER WITH WIFE AND TWO DEPENDENTS 
TO THE WEEKLY AVERAGE COVERED WAGE AS OF 
DECEMBER, 1961
State Per Cent State Per Cent
Arizona3 166.7 Idaho*3 50.2
Hawaii 95.0 Rhode Island 50.2
Massachusetts 77.7 Minnesota 49.6
District of Columbia 76.0 New York 48.8
California 66.2 Delaware 48.5
Alaska 65.8 Montana 48.2
Wisconsin 63.3 Ohio 48.2
Wyoming 62.8 Maryland 46.9
North Dakota3 61.5 Virginia3 45.8
Washington 58.8 South Dakota3 45.1
Nevada3 57.7 Tennessee3 44.8
Oregon 55.3 Kansas3 44.5
Utah3 55.2 Nebraska3 44.5
Arkansas3 55.0 Kentucky 44.4
New Hampshire 54.7 Iowa3 44.3
Mississippi 54.0 Colorado 44.2
United States 54.0 New Mexico 43.6
Connecticut 53.3 Alabama3 43.4
Illinois 53.2 Louisiana 42.3
Missouri 52.8 Oklahoma 41.4
Pennsylvania 52.7 Texas3 41.4
Sduth Carolina3 52.4 West Virginia 41.4
Florida3 51.9 Georgiaa 41.1
Maine 51.1 Michigan 41.1
North Carolina3 50.8 Indiana3 40.1
Vermont 50.8 New Jersey 36.9
aRight-to-work states.
^Median.
Source: Bureau of Labor Standards, State Workmen1s
Compensation Laws; A Comparison of Major Provisions with 
Recommended Standards, Bulletin No. 212, revised, December, 
1961.
56
is a better measure of central tendency than the average. 
This is because Arizona and Hawaii provide such extreme 
maximum payments. Table V shows that the median state, 
Idaho, provides 50.2 per cent. Nine right-to-work states 
lie above this median state and eleven fall below. The 
right-to-work states taken as a whole appear to be about on 
a par with the median state in meeting the needs of their 
disabled resident workmen, a fact which is not apparent from 
a comparison of maximum weekly dollar benefit provisions 
alone.
CONCLUSION REGARDING THE PURPOSE OF 
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS
In searching for evidence concerning the purpose of 
the right-to-work laws there were considered first, the 
policy statements contained in the laws themselves, that 
their purpose was the protection of the individual. These 
statements were direct evidence supporting Frederick's view.
Second, the proponents and the opponents of the laws 
were considered. It was found that organized business was 
on the side of the proponents and organized labor was on 
the side of the opponents. This was direct evidence in sup­
port of Sultan's view, that the right-to-work issue was a
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management versus union problem.
Third, the enforcement provisions and machinery con­
tained in the laws were considered. It was found that the 
enforcement machinery was completely absent and the enforce­
ment provisions so inadequate that an individual, as a prac­
tical matter, could not afford to enforce any rights given 
him by the laws, but that some business organizations would 
find it worth while to initiate litigation under them. This 
tended to support Sultan's view.
Fourth, the unemployment insurance laws and workmen's 
compensation laws of the various states were compared. This 
comparison disclosed that there was very little difference 
between right-to-work states and non-right-to-work states 
in providing substitute income to their unemployed and dis­
abled working residents. The comparisons failed to disclose 
either an above average concern or a marked disregard for 
the welfare and rights of the individual.
It is concluded that there is much evidence that the 
right-to-work issue constitutes a contest between management 
and unions and that this contest may very well be the prime 
mover or origin of the right-to-work movement. It is further 
concluded that although much concern for the welfare and 
rights of the individual is a factor in the right-to-work
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struggle, it is doubtful that it is the originating source.
MAJOR RIGHT-TO-WORK ARGUMENTS CLASSIFIED
In the remainder of this chapter some of the major 
arguments pro and con in the right-to-work controversy are 
classified according to the preceding dichotomy. No attempt 
to reconcile the different arguments is made. Such a classi­
fication is useful in identifying what is pertinent to the 
subject of this study and what is not pertinent.
Beniamin Aaron's Classification Re-Classified
Between December 22, 1951, the date the Steel case 
was certified by the President to the War Stabilization
Board, and March 20, 1952, the date the War Stabilization
Board announced its recommendations in that case, Benjamin 
Aaron, as a public member of that Board, received 1,350 
letters from people objecting in principle to the union shop, 
which was one of the issues involved in the Steel case. He
classified these objections as follows.
A. Nature of the Union Shop
1. It is unconstitutional, un-American, undemo­
cratic, fascistic, socialistic, pure slavery, 
and illegal (violates the anti-trust laws).
2. It is the closed shop under another name.
3. It is necessary only where the employer is 
trying to cheat his employees.
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4. It will result in "the type of labor socialist 
movement which destroyed the British Empire 
and enslaved the British worker."
5. It has fostered the growth of union monopolies.
6. It is bad for retail stores which heed prompt 
courteous salespeople.
B. Union Shop and the Individual Employee
1. An employee should not be deprived of his right
to work because he either does not want to join
a union or is unacceptable to the union.
2. No employee should be compelled to join a union
even if the majority votes for the union shop;
for if the majority votes against the union 
shop, his right to join the union is not re­
stricted.
3. The individual employee needs protection from 
unions more than he needs protection from 
employers.
a) He needs protection from the majority in con­
trol.
b) He needs protection from the minority in con­
trol.
c) He is powerless to protest against union 
policies for fear of losing his job or being 
blacklisted.
4. No employee should have to pay tribute to the 
union.
a) He should be able to hold his job solely on 
the basis of performance.
b) He is not required to join the political 
party which wins an election; he need not 
own property before sending his children to 
public tax-supported schools.
5. Most employees do not even want unions; only 
one-fourth of the labor force is organized.
6. In an open shop the employee is happy and con­
tented; in a union shop he is disgruntled 
because the other workers loaf and cannot be 
fired.
C. Union Shop and the Unions.
1. It is basically a device whereby union leaders 
get control over employees and income from them; 
it permits unions to extract unreasonable dues 
and initiation fees from workers.
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2. It is a device whereby union leaders seek to 
control production.
3. It tremendously increases the power of the 
unions, and this power is used contrary to 
public welfare. Union demands are the main 
cause of inflation.
4. It is unnecessary, as shown by the fact that 
union membership has increased since passage 
of the Taft-Hartley Act.
5. It relieves union leaders of the responsibility 
to organize; they should be compelled to "sell" 
their union to the workers.
6. It is bad because competition among unions is 
healthy.
7. It is bad because many union leaders are 
racketeers of the worst sort, with long criminal 
records; it has led to racketeering in unions.
D. Union Shop and Management
1. It takes away the power of management to operate 
the mills in the best interest of the most 
people.
2. It will force the closing of many small businesses; 
it will straight-jacket business generally and 
impede effective action.
3. It forces employers to become union business 
agents.
4. It will give unions power to bankrupt any com­
pany at will.
5. It is forcing American capital abroad for the 
greater return that is possible there.
6. It transfers to unions the employer's right to 
hire and fire without transferring the corollary 
responsibility for maintaining productive effici­
ency.
7. It slows down technological progress.
l ^
All these reasons can be re-classified under our 
dichotomy under (1) appeals to the individual, and (2)
•^Benjamin Aaron, "Public Opinion and the Union Shop," 
Southern Economic Journal, July, 1953, pp. 78-80.
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management versus union issues. Under the management versus 
union issues we find only Aaron's classification "D." In 
making this re-classification the original letters were not 
available, but Aaron's original classification based on 
their complete contents was accepted as reflecting their 
intent.
Paul Sultan's "Major Issues" Classified
In Chapter 5 of his Right to Work Laws,19 Paul Sultan 
discusses eleven "major issues" of the right-to-work contro­
versy.
1. Compulsory unionism deprives labor of its right 
to work.
2. Compulsory unionism is discriminatory.
3. Compulsory unionism imposes hardship on the
nonmember.
4. Compulsory unionism denies labor the freedom 
of association.
5. Union-security clauses contribute to union 
monopoly.
6. Compulsory unionism violates civil liberties; the 
issue of religion.
7. Compulsory unionism denies a person political 
freedom.
8. Compulsory unionism destroys union democracy.
9. Compulsory unionism destroys morale and
efficiency.
10. Compulsory unionism compels support of a union's 
injurious economic policies.
11. Right-to-work laws represent a logical extension 
of states' rights.
I
19Sultan, op. cit., pp. 63-71.
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Of these eleven "major issues" only three (numbers 5,
9, and 10) deal with the management versus union or economic
issue. The rest are directed to the individual or the 
political issue.
SUBJECT AREA OF THIS STUDY IDENTIFIED
The concern of this study lies in the economic area 
or the management versus union issue. The use of the
dichotomy between the popular or political issue and the
economic issue, as demonstrated by the reclassification of 
Aaron's and Sultan's lists of arguments, clarifies what the 
economic issue is, and what it is not, so that side issues 
and issues irrelevant to the economic issue may be eliminated 
from consideration and attention may be focused on the 
specific problem at hand.
SUMMARY
In this chapter the egalitarian ideal in our political 
philosophy, wherein each has one vote, was differentiated 
from our economic philosophy, wherein each one's voice depends 
on his control over resources and income. Dunlop's "Indus­
trial Relations System" concept was explored wherein the 
economic system and the industrial relations system are
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viewed as co-existing and equal subsystems of the total 
social system. In addition, four parties at interest in 
the union security issue were identified— the individual, 
management, the union, and society at large.
The right-to-work controversy was then inserted into 
"Pursuit and Escape" by Clark Kerr as a reasonable approxi­
mation or model of the conflict.
This model demonstrates that a political process is 
being used to resolve an economic issue. The idea was then 
developed that although the stated purpose of the right-to- 
work laws is protection of the individual (the political 
issue), the originating source of these laws may be economic, 
and a dichotomy can be established between the arguments 
directed to the individual and the arguments involving the 
economic issue. The use of this dichotomy was then demon­
strated by classifying the lists of arguments compiled by 
Aaron and by Sultan. Finally, the economic area was identi­
fied as the subject of this study.
CHAPTER IV
RIGHT-TO-WORK AND THE "PUZZLEMENT OF SOCIETY"
THE PUZZLEMENT OF SOCIETY
In Chapter II the history of public policy regarding 
union security in the United States was interpreted as a 
study of the competitive struggle for power between labor 
and management. Of that struggle Paul Sultan remarked:
The right-to-work controversy reflects the 
puzzlement of a society facing the reality of 
power blocs with an economic philosophy that 
largely denies their existence.1
The fact that this . "puzzlement■of society" permeates 
deeply into our economic system is evident in this chapter 
which begins by examining the economic rationale advanced by 
the proponents of the legislation.
The Dallas L. Jones Study
In his study, "The Implications Of The Right-To-Work
■^Sultan, op. cit., p. 3.
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2Laws," Dallas L. Jones identifies and defines several poli­
tical and personal problems in the union security issue. He 
names these problems: The legality of union security issues,
the closed shop and closed union, the union shop, the demo­
cratic and ethical considerations, the status of the union, 
the protection of membership rights, and why American unions 
seek security provisions. These problems are outside the 
scope of this study and can be eliminated from its consider­
ation.
Jones finally comes to the problem which he names "the 
question of bargaining power." He identifies it as follows:
At this point the employer and especially the small 
employer, might reply, "All of these arguments support­
ing the union shop may be true, but am I not allowing 
the union to increase its bargaining power as compared 
to my own? By my granting a union shop, the union 
secures a monopoly of the labor supply that undermines 
my own power."3
Although Jones barely mentions this issue, it is the problem 
with which we are concerned in this study.
2Dallas L. Jones, "The Implications Of The Right-To- 
Work Laws," Michigan Business Review, November, 1957, reprint, 
Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of 
Michigan, Wayne State University, Reprint series 3.
3Ibid., p. 8.
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Machlup on Public "Union Security" Policy
Fritz Machlup's explanation of union security as a 
problem in monopoly is typical. He explains that for the pur­
pose of "equalizing the bargaining power" the government has 
assisted in the creation of monopoly power of unmeasured 
magnitude wielded by hundreds of trade unions. He observes 
that when, in the past, the government created monopolies in 
the hands of businessmen, economists, almost unanimously, 
have evaluated the economic effects as bad. He then inquires 
into the possible results from the creation and exercise of 
trade union control over the price and supply of labor to the 
employer-.
Machlup1s first observation is that there is no way of 
telling what the unionization of labor will do to the balance 
or imbalance of bargaining power of the two parties. He says:
What the relative strength of the parties will be 
in a particular case under any particular condition 
cannot be determined. The hope that they be exactly 
or approximately "equal" has absolutely no foundation.4
Concerning the use of this increased bargaining power, Machlup
points out that trade unions can do nothing to make employers
more competitive in the purchase of labor or to break up
employers' conspiracies. The formation of labor unions and
4Machlup, op. cit., p. 379.
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the introduction of collective bargaining will merely induce 
employers to formalize their cooperative activities in regard 
to wage determination. The trade union approach to the prob­
lem is to set bargaining strength against bargaining strength, 
monopoly power against monopsony power.
He concludes as follows:
The official theory of the equalization of bargain­
ing strength serves as a moral and economic basis for 
the policy of government aid to the creation and in­
crease of union power. The moral basis is firm and 
solid. The economic basis is shaky, if only because 
we know from the theory of bilateral monopoly there 
is no way of telling the point at which the opposing 
powers are of "equal strength" and just "neutralizing" 
each other. No attempt is made in theory or in prac­
tice to limit the exercise of labor's collective 
bargaining power to what it would take to offset em­
ployer's collusion or restraint of competition.^
The Bilateral Monopoly Model and Wage Determination
At this point it might be well to look briefly at the
bilateral monopoly model as it is applied to wage deter-
\
mination. It will be useful to examine how this model is 
developed from the competitive model in order to see the 
changes that the introduction of monopoly elements inject and 
so understand better the opposition to unionism of those who 
have accepted the bilateral monopoly model as applying to 
their particular situation.
5Ibid., p. 376.
We begin with the proposition that the money demand 
for labor has less than infinite elasticity. This is re­
flected in the downward sloping demand line in Figure 1. Thi 
is true because the money demand for labor by an individual 
firm is a function of both the productivity of labor and the 
money demand for the firm's product. Increasing the quantity 
of labor in the production function of the firm is assumed to 
be subject to the principle of diminishing productivity.
Thus, even though a firm sells its product in a perfectly 
competitive market, its demand for labor, or the marginal 
revenue product of labor, will be declining.
W
0 NUnits of Labor
FIGURE 1
COMPETITIVE MODEL OF WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT
^ Allan M. Cartter, Theory of Wages and Employment 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin Inc., 1959), pp. 45-46
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The common assumption concerning the supply function
of labor is that it too is less than infinitely elastic, that
is to say, it is assumed to be an upward sloping supply curve. 
Among the reasons given for this assumption are that knowl-r
edge and mobility in the local labor market are not perfect, 
employers are not perfect substitutes for one another in the 
minds of potential employees, and many, if not most, employ­
ers are large enough to influence the general level of wages 
in their own labor markets.^
Figure 1 is the usually illustrated case, free from 
monopoly and monopsony elements, and the determination of
The equilibrium wage is OW with
employment, uw.
One traditional view of union behavior assumes that a 
trade union monopoly acts in identical fashion to a business 
monopoly. The union acting as a single seller of labor is 
large enough to know that the money demand for labor is 
negatively sloped as in Figure 2. The union is then said to 
try to equate the marginal demand for labor with its supply 
schedule at employment ON', demanding wage OW1. This wage 
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Units of Labor
FIGURE 2
BILATERAL MONOPOLY MODEL OF WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT
If the employer is not large enough to realize that 
the supply schedule to him is upward sloping, he will be a 
price taker, accept the wage, and equate his demand for 
labor with the new wage. This is the simple case of labor 
monopoly. If the employer is large enough, however, to know 
that his supply schedule of labor is upward sloping he will 
be tempted to equate his demand for labor with the marginal 
cost of labor, sometimes called his marginal output, and pay 
the lowest wage which will call forth the appropriate amount 
of labor as indicated by the supply curve. Thus, in Figure 
2 the monopsonistic employer will want to employ ON" units 
of labor and pay only the wage OW".
In this case of bilateral monopoly the actual wage 
rate is said to be indeterminate because of the market diver­
gence between the wage rates sought by the two parties. It 
is presumed that a compromise wage rate will be reached by 
collective bargaining somewhere between OW' and OW". This 
might perhaps approximate the competitive wage rate OW.® in 
any case the injection of monopolistic elements into the 
labor market by the labor unions will result in pressure to 
raise wages. For employers, especially those who have little 
bargaining power and who presumably are the smaller employers 
this means increased direct labor costs.
Concomitants of Union Wage Policy
One difficulty with the above type of analysis is that 
it approaches the problem in terms of just one goal of unions 
higher wages. Possibly even more generally important to the 
employer economically than higher wages is the development 
of restrictive practices embodied in agreements, tradition, 
legislation, or the more frequent interruption of work by 
disputes. (See the arguments against unionism listed in 
Chapter III/ page 60.)
These concomitants of union wage policy however, can
8Ibid., p. 80
72
be classified as cost increasing effects of unionism, because 
as Hoover in his Location of Economic Activity points out:
The effect of restrictions and interruptions is 
to increase overhead. In effect, to make a greater 
input of capital, land, and "overhead" labor 
necessary for a given rate of output.®
Thus high union bargaining power may result in high overhead
as well as high direct labor costs.
THE RESULT WHICH NEEDS TO BE DEMONSTRATED
In an economy subject to labor union bargaining power, 
the removal of this monopolistic element should relieve the 
pressure for wage rates above the competitive level. If a 
firm were possessed of monopsonistic power in the labor 
market, it might even be able to reduce wages below the com­
petitive level although this possibility is seldom admitted. 
In addition, union restrictive practices and work'.inter­
ruptions would be reduced. The reason for this is given by 
the National Right To Work Committee as follows:
It [right to work legislation] changes the character 
of union leadership by requiring that they spend a much 
greater part of their time and energy on doing those 
things which they should be doing, namely keeping the
^Edgar M. Hoover, The Location of Economic Activity 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1948), p. 114.
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membership sold on why they should stay in the 
union.10
All of this should result in generally decreased costs 
and increased profits to the firm, supplying an important 
stimulus to new firms and source of encouragement to existing 
firms receiving this advantage. Furthermore, if only a few 
states adopt right-to-work laws, this advantage would be 
available in only that segment of the economy. These states 
could then offer the possibility of cost reductions in the 
hope that some firms in non-right-to-work states might find 
it to their advantage to migrate to the right-to-work states. 
The proponents argument can be summarized as follows: If a
firm were considering two locations, and everything about 
each location was just the same except that one was in a 
right-to-work state and the other was not, would_not the 
firm choose the location in the right-to-work state? The 
effect would be the same as a subsidy to industry.
It would be normal then to expect to find those who 
attach so much importance to the passage of right-to-work 
laws enjoying their benefits once the laws were passed.
That is to say, there should be a great reduction in union
•^Letter from Reed Larson, Executive Vice-President 
of the National Right To Work Committee, Washington 6, D. C., 
November 21, 1962.
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security contract provisions and practices under right-to-work 
conditions. There should also be a migration of firms into 
right-to-work states based upon the importance of the advan­
tage that they attach to the presence of right-to-work legis­
lation. There have been some studies made that, among other 
things, investigated these occurrences.
The R. L. Frederick Study
The stated purpose of the study made by R. L. Fred-
IIerick for his unpublished Master's thesis, The Effect of 
Right to Work Laws Upon Industrial Growth," was to determine 
whether or not industrial growth had been impeded or imple­
mented by such l a w s . H e  first examined data published by 
the United States Department of Labor for the total number 
of production workers in all the right-to-work states. There 
were thirteen states with sufficient data available for a 
before and after comparison. In twelve of these thirteen 
states total employment had increased. Frederick concluded 
that the data did not necessarily show industrial growth 
because of the laws, but did lend some measure of credence to 
statements made on behalf of the laws on the point that the 
law did not appear on the surface to have any detrimental
•^Frederick, o£. cit., p. 1.
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effect on employment advance.^
Frederick also considered the findings of the National 
Right To Work Committee survey, released in January, 1956, 
that total non-farm employment in states with the legislation 
had increased by half again as much as the gains made by the 
rest of the country; that the civilian population in right to 
work states increased more than 30 per cent above the gains 
made in other states; and that the number of businesses in
i
operation in right to work states increased by more than 
twice the increase in the rest of the country. He attached 
particular significance to the fact that the Committee made 
a statement that no claim was made by them that right-to-work 
laws were the sole reason for this improvement. He noted 
further that, in spite of the rather substantial gains claimed 
in the survey in most areas of comparison, total income pay­
ments to individuals in right-to-work states only outgained 
the rest of the country by one per cent so that it could not
be said that individuals of these states profited to any
13reasonable extent due to the right-to-work laws.
Officials of the State Chamber of Commerce organiza­
tions in eighteen right-to-work states were interviewed and
12Ibid., p. 41. 13ibid.
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of these, two thought that right-to-work laws had no effect 
upon growth, three thought that right-to-work laws were a 
major factor aiding growth, and thirteen, a large majority, 
felt that the presence of a right-to-work law in their state 
was only one of many favorable factors to be considered by a 
firm when a new plant location or an expansion of an already 
existing plant was contemplated.14
Frederick summarized reports which he received from 
ip4 manufacturing company representatives in corporations con­
ducting operations in 41 states. He found that five considered 
the presence of a right-to-work law a major selection factor, 
sixteen said that they had no effect upon site selection, and 
eighty-three said that right-to-work laws were only one of 
many factors to be considered.1^
Industrial consultants, interviewed by Frederick, whose 
business was aiding in the selection of plant location sites 
all agreed that a right-to-work law was at best a very minor 
factor to be considered when aiding a client in the selection 
of a plant site.1**
Frederick finally concluded that the presence of a 
right-to-work law would be of little importance in attracting
14Ibid., p. 48. 15Ibid., p. 58. 16Ibid., p. 60.
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new industry to a state unless all other factors desired by 
a particular firm were available in that state.17
Fred Whitney1s Indiana Study
Fred Whitney studied the factors that were present in 
Indiana and contributed to the passage of the right-to-work 
law in that state. Although his article was written just one 
year after the passage of the law which was too soon to 
observe much of the experience in that state under the law, 
he notes:
Up to the present, the most startling development 
under the Indiana right-to-work law has been the 
action of both employers and unions in negotiating 
and extending agreements containing union shop clauses 
prior to the date upon which the law became effective.I8
Whitney explains that the right-to-work bill was en­
acted March 1, 1957, but did not become effective until June 
25, 1957. During this period of time some Indiana employers 
and unions extended contracts containing union shop provisions. 
A considerable number of these and other labor agreements 
were extended at this time in spite of the fact that they 
were not to expire until after the effective date of the
17Ibid., p. 62.
■**®Fred Whitney, "The Indiana Right to Work Laws," 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, July, 1958, p. 515.
78
law's operation. His concluding remark is pertinent to our 
problem: "The most significant feature of these wage con­
tract extensions is that the employer had no obligation what­
soever to extend the agreements."19
The Public Affairs Institute Study
John G. Shott undertook the task of making a study 
for the Public Affairs Institute investigating forces which 
were at work in the pioneer state, Florida, which brought 
the right-to-work issue to public attention for the first
ontime. In considerable detail, m  Chapter IV of"his study, 
he went into the attempts of the Florida attorney general to 
enforce the law after it was passed. He came to the con­
clusion that the attorney general failed in his efforts to 
obtain compliance by voluntary means and then tried to abolish 
the closed shop in the state by bringing in a privately 
organized and financed open shop organization from Arkansas 
to establish a state organization in Florida to police and 
enforce the open shop. This failed also.
In his final chapter in which he evaluated the Florida
19Ibid., p. 516.
20John G. Shott, How "Right To Work" Laws Are Passed, 
The Public Affairs Institute, Washington, D. C.# 1956.
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right-to-work amendment/ Shott found that two results of 
Florida's prohibition of union security were indicated.
First, there was non-compliance by employers and unions in 
the skilled trades where the employers traditionally have 
obtained workers through unions. Second,.there was a serious 
hindrance to organizational work in the unskilled trades. He 
concluded that the net result to the individual worker seemed 
to be that the amendment had in some cases reduced and in 
other cases eliminated the advantages to be derived from col­
lective bargaining.
The John William Lowe Study
I
In his unpublished Doctor's dissertation entitled
"Union Security in Florida Industries Under the Right To Work 
01Amendment,"^ J o h n  William Lowe undertook to examine closely 
union security practices under the Florida right-to-work law. 
As a result of his study he found that out of 81 firms he 
interviewed that had contracts with unions 36 acknowledged a 
preference for 100 per cent union membership among their 
employees, and admitted close relations with unions in their 
hiring practices. He established that union security
O]John William Lowe, "Union Security m  Florida Indus­
tries Under the Right to Work Amendment" (unpublished Doctor's 
dissertation, University of Florida, Gainesville, 1956).
arrangements did exist and that business^ firms were willing 
to admit arrangements which were not compatible with the 
state law. He found that there was a definite relationship 
between the period of time that a plant had been organized, 
and both 100 per cent union membership of the plant's employ­
ees, and the practices and attitudes which encouraged 100 per
• 00 cent union membership of the plant's employees. In other
words, he found that there was one group of employers who not 
only did not advocate right-to-work laws, but instead pre­
ferred union security arrangements.
Lowe also received critical comments on unionism, 
mostly from non-union employers, and these were in sharp con­
trast to many of the case studies he had made of those firms 
that had long experience with contractual relationships with 
unions and on the whole reported preferences for the union 
shop. He stated that many of these employers were strongly 
anti-union to the extent that some unions, faced by these 
employers, may have decided to forego pressure for union 
security.23 That is to say, he found that there .was.: another 
group of employers who not only supported right-to-work laws 
but insisted on their observance by the unions.
22Ibid., p. 127* 23Ibid., p. 128.
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Lowe's final conclusions are pertinent because they 
concern the problem that is the subject of this study. He 
found that there was only a small number of cases against 
unions which had been brought to court in Florida in spite 
of the fact that a review of the Florida ^ases showed that 
if an employer actually desired to fight unionism he had the 
strong support of the state and federal courts. If this were 
Lowe's .only finding, it would have to be discounted because 
of the possibility that court action is such an expensive 
alternative that many firms would not have enough at stake 
to utilize it; but in addition to this finding Lowe reported 
that the man who was the attorney general in Florida at that 
time (1957) had been in office for eight years without being 
requested to examine or construe any specific union security 
agreement, an alternative not involving great expense. He 
concluded that these findings plus the frankness with which 
most firms discussed their violation or evasion of the right- 
to-work amendment was a strong indication that no aggressive 
enforcement of the law was expected or desired.
Lowe's conclusion suggests the existence of a sizeable 
third group of employers. A group which supports the right-
24Ibid., p. 196.
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to-work proposals before the fact, but evades them after the 
fact. Frederick Meyers, in his study, discovered the exist­
ence of a similar group of employers in Texas.
The Texas Study by Frederick Meyers
In his study Right To Work In Practice2^ Frederick 
Meyers examined the Texas experience under the right-to-work 
laws during the eleven years following 1947. In one part of 
his study he discusses the attitudes which he found toward 
the law. He summarizes this section as follows:
Everyone in Texas labor relations knows that the 
"Right To Work" law is systematically violated in 
the traditionally closed shop industries. Certainly 
the employers are aware of a situation in which they 
participate. And yet, there is feeling, even strong 
feeling, that the law is a good thing. The realities 
of labor relations may dictate a closed shop practice, 
but the symbolic force of "Right To Work" remains
powerful.26
Meyers interviewed a substantial number of union con­
tractors and officials of contractors' associations. He 
found that although the attitudes of all these varied widely, 
there was general agreement on the principle of the statute, 
despite its general non-observance. It was generally 
regarded as a statement of moral principle that one contractor
^Frederick Meyers, Right To Work In Practice, The 
Fund for the Republic,,New York, 1959.
26Ibid., p. 18.
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said was the Magna Carta of worker and employer rights.
Meyers noted, however, that this same man as well as all 
others interviewed declared that the construction industry 
could not operate if it observed the law. Based on his over­
all observation of labor relations in Texas, he concluded 
that the right-to-work statute in Texas, taken by itself 
apart from the whole body of state labor legislation, has 
had a minimal direct effect. He said in his conclusion:
"It remains my feeling that 'right to work' proposals are of 
much less importance than either side of the controversy has 
been willing to admit. 1,27
In explaining why the right-to-work proposals were sup­
ported so strongly by those interested in getting the laws 
passed, only to be ignored so generally once those laws were 
passed, Meyers concluded that the issue was a symbolic one. 
That what was at stake was the political power and publict
support of management and of unionism. He suggests that the
right-to-work proposals have become a convenient symbol for
this purpose, perhaps because, in effect, they do mean so
little. He concludes:
The issue raised by both the partisans and the 
opponents of right-to-work are serious ones because
27Ibid., p. 45.
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they involve the question of how we are to achieve 
freedom in a complex industrial society. And yet, 
as this study indicates, the claims of either side 
as to what will happen if this law is enacted have 
little to do with actual practice. This does not 
mean that we are freed of our obligation to consider 
the issues. It does mean that we must confront them 
on a more relevant level, so that we may free them 
from the passions and exaggerations of right-to-work 
debate.
Right-to-work legislation is more than a symbol. The 
disparity between anticipation and practice is an outgrowth 
of what was called the "puzzlement of society" earlier in 
this chapter and may be understood if confronted on the more 
relevant level Meyers suggests.
SUMMARY
In this chapter it was pointed out that the right-to- 
work issue; merely reflects a deeply permeating puzzlement of 
society. The economic issue, as the proponents see it, was 
identified as the problem of equalizing the bargaining power 
of management and labor— basically the theory of bilateral 
monopoly.
The theory of bilateral monopoly was then discussed 
for the purpose of showing (1) that the theory is indetermin­
ate, and (2) even though indeterminate, the removal of union
2®Ibid., p. 46.
bargaining power from the labor market should reduce pres­
sures for high wages and overhead costs attributable to 
unions. This should enable some firms to reduce production 
costs. It was believed that this would encourage old firms, 
stimulate new ones, and induce the migration of firms from 
non-right-to-work states into right-to-work states.
Finally, some studies on the effects of right-to-work 
laws were considered. These studies indicated that the right- 
to-work propositions were advocated with great enthusiasm, 
but that the great advantages anticipated in theory did not 
materialize. Once the laws were passed many employers who 
supported them only gave them lip service.
This "puzzlement of society" is confronted on a more 
relevant level in Chapter V.
CHAPTER V
RIGHT-TO-WORK AND PLANT LOCATION THEORY 
SOME REASONS FOR THE EMPHASIS ON COSTS
Certainly/ wage theory utilizing the marginal produc­
tivity principle is far from perfect. No theory of wages can 
be perfect which is limited in view to a relatively simple 
relationship between two primary variables. It is not that 
the marginal principal is invalid, but the use of it is 
occasionally improper.1 At this point it is pertinent to 
point out that the anticipations of benefits to accrue from 
right-to-work legislation emphasize costs of production and 
that demand for the product is not even mentioned.
In his book The Wage Price Issue, William G. Bowen 
gave several reasons why the cost variable was given a rela­
tively more active role as compared to the demand variable in 
the price setting process of the firm.2 Some of the same
^artter, op. cit., p. 74.
2William G. Bowen, The Wage Price Issue (Princeton, N. v 
J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 257-97.
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reasons are responsible for the assignment of the relatively 
more active role to the cost variable by the proponents in 
the right-to-work controversy.
In the first place it seems plausible to expect the
texistence of uncertainty to result in the assignment of a 
relatively more important role to cost than to demand. This 
is primarily because the variables that determine the costs 
of a firm are more under the control of the firm and can be 
better estimated than the variables that affect demand. For 
example, it is hard for the firm to predict such important 
determinants of the demand for its product as the trend in 
the incomes of customers and the buying opportunities that 
other firms will make available to these customers. On the 
other hand, the cost accountant is able to make an estimate 
of costs which, while far from perfect or exact, is generally 
more reliable than the available estimates of demand for the 
product of the firm.
A second reason why costs are particularly significant 
under conditions of uncertainty is that changes in costs are 
usually more permanent than changes in demand. After all, the 
demand for a product depends on a great many factors, most of 
which are beyond the control or knowledge of the individual 
firm. The firm can seldom be sure that a sudden increase in
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orders will continue or that a trickle of orders will not 
turn into a flood. On the other hand, the firm cannot expect 
to suddenly find very often that the wage increase it just 
negotiated has suddenly been annulled.
A third reason costs are given an active role has to 
do with timing. An increase in costs reduces profits more 
certainly and more immediately than a decrease in the rate 
of product turnover or demand which occurs more slowly, often 
so slowly that it is not noticed, and i£ not only always hard 
to predict but often impossible to explain.
In addition to the above reasons suggested by Bowen, 
there is another reason why costs are given an active role 
and demand is ignored by the right-to-work proponents. It 
accounts for the fact that the right-to-work issue has re­
mained so intractable. Locational theory and practice have 
undergone a transition from the purely competitive approach 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth century theorists to 
the monopolistically competitive locational framework of to­
day. It focuses attention upon data that make the plant site 
a means of control over economic areas rather than simply the 
basis of productive operations. Whereas the purely competi­
tive approach was defensive in nature, the vastly greater 
present day emphasis on monopolistic advantages offered by
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different sites makes aggressive use of location factors that 
formerly were overlooked. Those who advocate right-to-work 
laws for economic reasons have not made this transition.
They are still facing the reality of power blocs with an 
economic philosophy that largely denies their existence.
They are using what amounts to a part of production theory 
as their rationale for advocating right-to-work legislation.
REVIEW OF LOCATION THEORY
In order to relegate right-to-work legislation to its 
proper position and importance as a factor in industrial 
growth it is necessary to have a comprehensive understanding 
of what is involved in location theory. For this reason a 
minimum step in outlining location theory is undertaken in 
this section by reviewing briefly the work of Melvin L.
Greenhut who in Part One of his book Plant Location in Theory
3and in Practice, has given a rather thorough review of loca­
tion theory.
Greenhut divides location theories into two basic types 
or classes. The first type is of the classical or neo-classi­
cal type in which, because of the acceptance of Say's Law and
^Melvin L. Greenhut, Plant Location in Theory and in 
Practice (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1956).
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possibly because of the reasons suggested by Bowen mentioned 
above, demand is assumed as given. That is, the characteris­
tics of the market are those of perfect competition. These 
theories which deal with the cost side of production only, 
Greenhut calls "Least-Cost Location Theories." Typical of 
this class are the works of Johann Heinrich von Thtlnen,^
Alfred Weber,^ and Edgar Hoover.8
The second type of location theory emphasizes the mar­
ket area of the firm and sketches the interdependence of plant 
locations. It stresses the influence of monopolistic gains 
at certain sites. Some of those who have contributed to this 
approach are Harold Hotelling,7 H. W. Singer,8 August Losch,9
^Johann Heinrich von Thiinen, Per Isolierte Staat in 
Beziehung auf Landwirtschaft und Nationalokonomie, Hamburg, 
1826.
8Carl Joachim Friedrich, Alfred Weber's Theory of the 
Location of Industries,(Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1929).
Hoover, loc. cit.
7Harold Hotelling, "Stability in Competition," Eco­
nomic Journal, 1929, pp. 41-57.
8H. W. Singer, "A Note on Spatial Price Discrimina­
tion," Review of Economic Studies, October, 1937, p. 77.
^August Losch, Die RSumliche Ordnung der Wirtschaft, 
Zweite Auflage, Verlag von Gustav Fischer, Jena, 1944.
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P. A. Fetter,^-® and-1 Edgar Hoover. ̂  Greenhut himself attempts 
to integrate the leading theories of plant location. The 
evolution of location theory can best be illustrated by a 
brief review of Greenhut's work.
Least-Cost Location Theories
The following three headings are outlines of least- 
cost location theories. In each it will be noted that the 
market is assumed to be competitive and given.
Von ThGnen1s theory of location.— Von Thunen postu­
lates a land surface homogeneous in all respects save distance 
from the consuming center or city. The city dwellers supply 
the outlying districts with their manufactures in exchange 
for agricultural produce, food and raw materials. Farm 
produce is sold in each outlying region at the city price 
less the difference in transport costs from that region to 
the city market. As the distance from the city increases, 
transport costs increase. There is a distance or radius from 
the city where the cost of producing any product plus the 
cost of its transport to the city just equals the price paid




in the city. This is the extensive limit for its production. 
At this limit no rent can be paid. Beyond it the product 
cannot be produced. At locations progressively nearer the 
city, transportation costs become less and land rent can be 
paid equal to the reduction of the transport charges. Now 
some products cost more to transport than others; hence, 
their extensive limit of production will be nearer the city 
than the more cheaply transported products, and the amount of 
rent that they can pay at production sites progressively 
nearer the city will increase at a faster rate than the rent 
the relatively more cheaply transported product can pay. Thus 
von Thtinen1s theory gives us a scheme of concentric circles 
around a central town, the market, which while not fully 
applicable to all industrial locations, is nevertheless use­
ful.
As the distance from the city increases and transport 
costs increase, land rent, the intensity of land cultivation, 
and the density of population decrease. In the distance, 
cultivation ceases entirely. Although von Thiinen is primarily 
interested in the type of farm produce that is most advan­
tageously cultivated on a given plot of land, Greenhut con­
verts his theory into an analysis of site selection for 
manufacturing plants by merely changing the occupation of the
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producers from cultivating the land to manufacturing. It is 
important to note that von ThCnen assumes an infinitely 
elastic demand for the commodities at the market. In effect, 
he substitutes transportation cost for land cost and vice 
versa until he obtains the least-cost combination and thus 
the best plant site.
Weber's theory of location.— Weber assumes a hetero­
geneous land surface with uneven deposits of fuel and raw 
materials and several consuming centers. This is procedur­
al ly the opposite of von Thtlnen. Weber's theory is based 
upon three general, factors of location: transportation costs,
labor costs, and agglomerating forces. The transportation and 
labor costs are regarded as general regional factors; the 
agglomerating force is a general local factor.
In regard to the transportation cost factor, he con­
cludes that plants may be material oriented or they may be 
market oriented. Materials that lose weight in processing 
call the plant to their deposits, but if weight is added in 
the processing, a location nearer the market is favored. If 
cost of transfer is the only significant factor, the site 
with the lowest transportation cost will be selected.
In considering his second factor, labor, Weber did not 
make the special von Thtinen assumptions of equal real wages
94
and productivity everywhere; consequently, the labor factor 
exerts a locational pull in his scheme. This force may even 
be the dominant one and cause the movement of industry from 
a point of least transfer cost to a site of greater transfer 
cost. This will occur whenever the savings in labor costs 
are larger than the additional transfer costs. These two 
locational factors account for location within a region..
Weber's third general factor is the agglomerating or 
deglomerating force. This may cause concentration or dis­
persion within a region. Proximity or auxiliary industries, 
better marketing outlets, or economies of size are agglomerat­
ing forces and tend to localize an industry. Higher rent is 
a deglomeraging factor and tends to disperse an industry.
Weber found a rather close relationship between the labor 
factor and the agglomerating factors. That is, generally 
when labor is a vital part of the value added to a product, 
a positive force of agglomeration exists. In effect, Weber 
divided industries into two main categories, those oriented 
to transportation and those oriented to labor. His theory of 
location involves substitution between transport costs and 
non-transport cost factors. Demand considerations are ex­
cluded from his theory which holds by definition that location 
factors give advantages in cost. There is a footnote to this
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section in which Greenhut says: "Obviously, the theory of
location, applicable to present day capitalistic economy, can
not adhere to the formula: Profit advantage equals cost
12advantage." It is necessary to explore location theory 
further.
Hoover's cost analysis.— Hoover, in his booh,The Loca-
13tion of Economic Activity, despite references to demand, 
has written largely within the framework of cost analysis. 
Hoover's theory, does not fit perfectly into the von Thiinen- 
Weber type system because his approach suggests demand deter­
minants as well as cost factors. Hoover separates the cost 
factors of location into two groups: transportation factors
and production factors.
The costs of procuring raw materials and the costs of 
distributing the finished products are considered transporta­
tion costs. The agglomerating factors and institutional cost 
factors are treated as partial determinants of production 
costs. His main contribution here is his thorough-going 
analysis of the characteristics of these factors.
Hoover shows that freight cost theory should recognize 
such characteristics as heavy terminal costs, length of haul,
•^Greenhut, op. cit., p. 17. -^Hoover, loc. cit.
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carload lot and less-than-carload lot shipments, shipments 
requiring special handling, and the particular advantages of 
specialized types of water, rail, and trucking facilities.
He views freight absorbtion the same way. The firm 
that absorbs freight costs gains by locating close and loses 
by locating at a distance from those it deais with.
None of these freight considerations change the basic 
theory. All they do is define the specific shape of the 
transportation cost function and add alternate transport cost 
function possibilities for each new avenue of transport con­
sidered.
Hoover's analysis of the agglomerating and deglomerat- 
ing forces is also more penetrating than that of Weber. He 
points out inter-industry advantages of agglomerating such as 
the use of another's by-products, the complementary use of 
labor, and the possibility of specializing to a higher degree, 
so that operations that an isolated firm might have to perform
i
for itself can be farmed out economically. He does for the 
production cost function what he did for the transport cost 
function. He adds definition.
In basic effect, Hoover's theory is quite similar to 
Weber's. The locational choice is still a problem of sub­
stitution among costs. He does not explain the whys of the
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location from the standpoint of demand. He keeps the analy­
sis largely within a purely competitive and capitalistic 
framework. ̂
Market Oriented Location Theories
In least-cost location theory the firm with the better 
location sells at the prevailing market price with greater 
profits than those obtained by competitors less fortunately 
situated. All sellers locate in respect to a buying center 
and haye access to this small area point. The market area 
analysis is in contrast with this purely competitive frame­
work. Under this type of analysis buyers are conceived as 
scattered over an area. Sellers will locate accordingly, 
and will thereby control different groups of buyers. Thus 
the demand curve at each location is not a horizontal line. 
Each seller becomes a monopolist in respect to customers who 
are located near his plant.
If this assumption of buyer scattering is correct, 
the least-cost system is nothing more than a very special 
model. The optimum location becomes not merely the site at 
which the firm achieves greater gains per unit sale at the 
given market price, but it is the location which enables the
•^Greenhut, op. cit., pp. 17-22.
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firm to undersell its rivals at several consuming points and 
thereby to place a wider market area under its control.
With buyers scattered over a wide area it is unrealis­
tic to presuppose a special location which is most advantag­
eously situated in respect to the entire market. Some loca­
tions that are high in cost relative to other locations or 
even high in/Cost relative to the whole market area may be 
the most profitable because of their location with respect to 
a particular segment of the market.
\
According to Greenhut, there are two approaches to the 
attempt to determine the spatial features of a firm's market. 
The first, the market area approach, assumes fixed locations 
and is essentially a short run analysis. The second, the 
locational interdependence approach, uses movable locations 
or planned future locations and is designed for long run 
analysis.
The market from the demand point of view.— In the analy­
sis by the market area approach which follows, consumers are 
assumed to be evenly scattered and to have identical demands.
By this means, the dollar volume of sales is made to correspond 
to the unit area of the market area that is controlled by the 
firm. One other distinction needs to be kept in mind. The 
market area refers to the entire market. The market area of
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a firm refers only to those customers who buy advantageously 
from a particular firm and who purchase nothing from its 
competitors.15
The size and shape of the market area of a firm.— The 
following simple model begins the demonstration of the market 
area analysis.
1. Buyers are assumed to be evenly scattered and 
to have identical demand schedules.
2. The market is monopolistically competitive 
and firms are geographically dispersed.
3. All rivals charge a net mill price which is 
marked up above their cost by the same sum.
4. The produce is sold on a f.o.b. mill basis.
Under the f.o.b. mill system of pricing the sales 
price and the freight rate on the final product are the deter­
minants of a firm's market area. Thus, two sellers located 
in different sectors divide the entire market area evenly if 
they have the same freight rates, charge the same mill prices, 
and sell a homogeneous product.
Any decrease in the freight rate or sales price of one 
firm as compared to the other widens the market area controlled 
by this firm; any increase narrows it. In fact, the firm's 
entire market area may be destroyed if its net mill price plus
i
freight costs to any and all buyers exceeds those of the other
•̂ Ibid., pp. 23-25
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firm. The long run optimum location of the firm will also 
change to better serve the segment of the market remaining 
to it. Distortions in the line dividing the markets of the 
two firms will be caused by such factors as freight rate 
progressions within mileage brackets, carriers' use of basing 
points to meet competition, discriminatory pricing policies 
of the firms, and product differentiation. There may even 
be overlapping of the market areas when the markets are less 
than perfectly competitive for reasons other than space and 
number of sellers. ^
Losch's definition of the firm's minimum size market 
area.— August Losch realized that his explanation of the 
minimum size and shape of the firm's market area would be 
more illustrative of a principle than representative of the 
real world because he began as follows: "In the following
example we proceed from radical assumptions to prevent spatial 
differences being concealed in our model."•L7
He assumed that economic raw materials were evenly dis­
tributed over a wide plain. The area was homogeneous in every 
other respect as well. It had a uniformly distributed
16Ibid., pp. 25-31.
•^LSsch, o£. cit., p. 72.
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agricultural population with each individual having identical 
tastes, preferences, technical knowledge and production oppor­
tunities. In the beginning the area contained nothing but 
self-sufficient farms, regularly distributed.
He begins by inquiring into the situation in which a 
farmer wants to go into the beer business. The extent of his 
operations will be limited by freight costs, but he can gain 
the advantages of large scale operations and specialization.
If the market demand is sufficient the farmer can sell advan­
tageously over a circular area. If the demand is too small 
relative to shipping costs, or the advantages of large scale 
production are too small, beer cannot become a marketable 
product and every farmer will have to brew his own as best 
he can.
If demand is large enough, however, beer production is 
immediately profitable, but in time competitors will enter 
the business and compress the circular market area to smaller 
and smaller size. The minimum size is that market area which 
is necessary for sales to just cover costs.18 This is the
I QChamberlinian tangency case. 3
v
18Ibid.. pp. 71-96.
19Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 84.
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The locational interdependence approach.— In the pre­
vious discussion of the size and shape of the market area of 
a firm, plant locations were assumed, and it was from this 
point that the size and shape of the firm's market area were 
discussed. If it is assumed that there is (1) an even spatial 
scattering of consumers, (2) an infinitely inelastic demand 
for the product of an industry, (3) equal costs of procuring 
and processing raw materials at all locations, (4) the same 
freight rate on the final product at all locations, (5) a 
perfectly competitive market except as regards space, and (6) 
sales of goods on a f.o.b. mill basis, firms tend to concen­
trate in the center of the entire market area. If, however, 
the market is not infinitely inelastic, but rather, each 
consumer's demand is identical and downward sloping, disper­
sion occurs.
Greenhut points out that the market area type of analy­
sis disregards factors of concentration, never shows that 
firms are sometimes attracted to sites near their rivals, and 
does not define the maximum size of operation. The inter­
dependence approach, on the other hand, seeks to find reasons 
for a particular location. It works with freely movable 
locations or planned future locations, and stresses the at­
traction or repulsion of a firm caused by the presence of a
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rival at a specific location. That is, it considers the 
factors causing industrial concentration and dispersion. It 
is like the market area analysis, however, in that it also
onconsiders the monopolistic aspects of space.
Since locational, interdependence is not concerned with 
the size and shape of the market area of a firm, the problem
i
can be simplified by assuming a linear market rather than an 
areal market. The difference is that the market will expand 
proportionately with the distance from the plant in the 
linear model whereas it will expand proportionately to the 
square of the distance from the plant in the areal model.
The conclusions reached in the linear model can be modified 
to fit the areal model.
The, profit maximizing nondiscriminatory f.o.b. mill 
price of the spatial monopolist.— Before proceeding with the 
study of locational interdependence, it is necessary to have 
clearly in mind the characteristics of the profit maximizing 
nondiscriminatory f.o.b. mill price. This price refers to 
the seller's price at the mill. The buyer pays full freight 
to the transport agency. It is only nondiscriminatory in 
that each buyer purchases the product at the same mill price,
20Greenhut, pp. cit., pp. 37-42.
but, actually it can be used as a means of effecting spatial 
price discrimination through freight absorption by the seller. 
A word of caution needs to be inserted here. The rate of 
absorption is based on the freight rate to distant buyers.
It might seem that since all the buyers are assumed to have 
identical demand schedules, that basing the rate of absorption 
on freight costs per unit sold would be the same thing. It is 
not. This is because buyers located near the plant will pur­
chase larger quantities of the goods than distant buyers 
because they will not be burdened by freight charges which 
we will assume increase proportionately with distance from 
the mill, and we assume that the buyer's elasticity of demand 
is less than infinitely elastic. Figure 3 is a graphic 
illustration of the principle involved.
Assume one buyer, with linear, downward sloping demand 
curve, located proximate to the mill so that purchases are 
made at the mill net price without freight entering into the 
considerations of his purchases. The profit maximizing f.o.b. 
mill price to this one customer is shown in Figure 3 A. AK 
is the buyer's demand curve and AH is the corresponding 
marginal revenue curve. Since we are abstracting from costs, 














F.O.B. MILL PRICE DEMAND SCHEDULES FACED BY 
A SPATIAL MONOPOLIST
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Now if a second buyer is assumed to be located at a 
distance from the plant so that freight has to be paid, and 
this buyer has a demand curve that is identical to the first 
buyer, and if the freight rate from the plant to him is equal 
to AB; his demand curve will appear, along with the data of 
the first buyer, as BI in Figure 3 B. and the corresponding 
marginal revenue curve will be BG. At the original f.o.b. 
mill price OC he will take OF units of product.
If the producer is able to practice price discrimina­
tion between the two buyers he will lower the f.o.b. mill 
price to the second buyer to OE while maintaining the f.o.b. 
mill price to the first buyer at OC. Thus he will maximize 
his profits by absorbing CE on sales to the second buyer 
which is half the freight rate to the second buyer.
The seller can accomplish the same thing with the 
profit maximizing nondiscriminatory f.o.b. mill price, by 
summing the demand at the mill schedules of these two buyers 
horizontally. In this case, the demand schedule for the total 
market is ANL and the corresponding marginal revenue curve is 
AMT. The profit maximizing nondiscriminatory f.o.b. mill 
price will then be OD and he will absorb CD on all sales 
which is the equivalent of one-half the r-aver age freight rate 
to all his customers. (Remembering the note of caution, this
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is not the equivalent of one-half the average freight cost 
per unit of product sold.)
If buyers are spaced evenly along a line with the 
first buyer promixate to the mill, freight absorption will 
be 25 per cent since the average freight rate will be 50 per 
cent of the freight rate to the most distant customer.
If there is no customer proximate to the mill and all 
customers are located equidistant from the mill the absorp­
tion rate will be 50 per cent, the same as the case of only 
one buyer located a distance from the seller. This is so 
because the average distance is the full distance.
If the market is not distributed along a line, but 
spread over an area circular in shape with the seller in the 
center, the following modifications will apply.
If the buyers are all located proximate to the mill no 
freight will be absorbed. If the buyers are all located on 
the perimeter the absorption rate will be 50 per cent. If 
the buyers are evenly dispersed over the area of the circle 




The maximum sales radius of the profit maximizing 
nondiscriminatory spatial monopolist.— Prom the above con­
siderations, some conclusions can be drawn concerning the 
maximum size of the market, of the profit maximizing nondis­
criminatory spatial monopolist. Since the model is still
• /abstracting from costs, this monopolist will find it profit­
able to expand his market so long as the increased sales net 
him anything at all. It may be that he can actually compute 
the average transportation rate to his customers, divide it 
by two and know what his rate•of absorption is. Lacking 
actual computation of the average transportation rate, if he 
is already in business, he will have data available from 
which he can determine some very general characteristics of 
his market. Is it linear? Is is areal? Are the buyers con­
centrated near the plant, at the perimeter, or are they 
evenly scattered? If he is planning'to establish a new divi­
sion or branch plant, research on the market can be done to 
indicate these characteristics.
With knowledge of these characteristics and the guide 
lines developed in the preceding section (which can be re­
fined to show intermediate points), he is in a position to 
estimate his freight absorption rate. So long as the sum of 
the freight rate to the most distant buyer plus the freight
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absorbed is less than the profit maximizing nondiscriminatory 
f.o.b. miil price, there will be a net return to the seller 
and it will pay him to expand his market. The limit of his 
market then is the point at which the freight rate to the 
most distant buyer plus the freight absorbed just equals his
ppprofit maximizing nondiscriminatory f.o.b. mill price.
The relation of f.o.b. mill prices of competitors and 
the profit maximizing location of the spatial monopolist.—  
There remains the problem of whether a firm will locate 
proximate to, or at a distance from, its rivals. This invol- 
' ves the study of the relationship between the spatial mono­
polist's marginal cost and demand functions. Traditional 
economic theories of imperfect competition must be related 
to a spatial economy.
- The results of such an analysis can be summarized in 
a sort of general rule: In a market area with a relatively
even scatter of the buying population, if sellers are willing 
to compete actively so as to gain control over markets proxi­
mate to their location, a dispersion of firms will result even 
though marginal costs of production are higher at a point 
away from the low marginal cost point of production, provided,
22Ibid., pp. 48-57.
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that they are higher by less than the freight rate between 
the two points. If, however, the marginal costs of produc­
tion are higher by more than the freight rates between the 
two points, a concentration of firms will result.23
There are several other types of cases which could be 
examined in which the sellers abstain from unrestrained price 
competition but compete in everything but price. In such 
event it can be shown that firms tend to concentrate rather 
than disperse. In a general way competition in location is 
synonymous with competition in price.24
Toward a More Complete Theory of Plant Location
It has been shown in the previous discussions that the 
theory of plant location has developed along two lines. The 
first approach searches for the least-cost site by abstract­
ing from demand and from the monopolistic implications of 
space by assuming competitive pricing of the product at the 
market which is located at a point. It assumes different 
costs among locations. All the sellers have access to the 
buying center where the market is purely competitive with an 
unlimited demand for the output of any seller at the prevail­
ing market price.
23Ibid., pp. 57-65 24Ibid., pp. 65-75.
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The second approach emphasizes the search for the 
most advantageous site by abstracting from cost, and is an 
outgrowth of monopolistic competition analysis. The cost 
of procuring and processing raw materials is assumed to be 
the same everywhere, and each seller charges an identical 
net mill price, but the buyers are conceived to be scattered 
over an area so that the delivered price varies with the 
distances between the consumers and the sellers. The market 
area-locational interdependence approach emphasizes the con­
trol over specific buyers that is offered by location in a 
space economy. These two approaches are not incompatible, 
however. They are both part of the same basic theory.
The maximum profit location, by definition, is that 
site at which the spread between total receipts and total 
costs is the greatest. The necessary condition for a maximum 
profit is that marginal revenue equal marginal cost. Under 
the least-cost approach, the competitive price is a constant, 
and is equal to average and marginal cost? consequently, the 
extension of production to that point where the added cost 
of producing the last unit just equals the pric^ equates 
marginal cost with marginal revenue.
Under the market area-locational interdependence ap-
/
proach the average cost is a constant and is equal to
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marginal cost, and the emphasis on the adjustment of the 
price and extension of the market to that point where the 
added revenue from the last unit sold just equals the average 
cost of production, equates marginal revenue with marginal 
cost. Thus, both variable cost and flexible, demand can be 
included within a single system of thought or theory.26
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT FACTORS 
IN LOCATION THEORY
It follows that where the market situation in which 
the seller finds himself approximates the market assumptions 
of the least-cost approach to location theory, the variables 
emphasized by the least-cost approach will be the most impor­
tant to consider in solving both location and production 
problems. Textile, shoe manufacturing, and garment industries 
face this type market,26 and these are the very industries 
which concern themselves with and seem to be attracted by 
right-to-work laws.2  ̂ They have very little to gain from
25Ibid., pp. 97-100.
26"subsidized Industrial Migration: The Luring of
Plants to New Locations," American Federation of Labor, 
Washington, D. C., 1955, p. 17.
2^Paul A. Brinker, "The South: Stagnation or Progress,"
American Federationist, July, 1962, pp. 16-18.
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emphasis on the monopolistic aspects of demand. The prospect 
of reducing costs through lower labor costs induced by right- 
to-work laws, lower taxes caused by local tax concessions, 
lower rent caused by local government providing factory sites 
and buildings at nominal cost, and other forms of cost sub­
sidy will seem relatively more important to this type of 
industry, whose best course of action lies in reducing dis­
advantages (a defensive type action), rather than an aggres­
sive use of market advantages.
On the other hand, in cases where the seller finds him­
self in a situation that more nearly approximates the assump­
tions of the market area-locational interdependence approach, 
an aggressive exploitation of the possibilities of the market 
and the spatial aspects of the production site will be much 
more rewarding than emphasis on cost reduction. E. H. 
Chamberlin explained it this way:
Popular economic philosophy continues to regard 
the businessman as a producer only. It is by neg­
lecting the market that it most obviously falls 
short of esqplaining the facts of economic life, and 
yet, the typical businessman has discovered, perhaps 
through experience, that in this world of monopolies, 
there are greater rewards to be gained through close 
attention to advertising, selling costs, and the 
market, than through a like attention to production
costs and e f f i c i e n c y . 2 8
28Lecture before the Graduate Economic Club, Louisiana 
State University, January 5, 1963.
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CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE "PUZZLEMENT OF SOCIETY"
It is concluded that there is a sizeable group of 
employers who strongly advocate right-to-work laws before 
the fact, and evade them after the fact. This is part of 
what has been called the "puzzlement of society" in this 
study. Within this frame of reference the right-to-work 
controversy is not symbolic. It is symptbmatic of an un­
solved social problem. These advocates of right-to-work laws 
are basing their policy decisions regarding right-to-work 
laws on an incomplete location theory that is now recognized 
to be only production theory. They have failed to synthesize 
monopolistic and competitive theory.
The explanation for this failure lies partly in the 
fact that the subject matter is difficult per se, but it lies 
more in the fact that the process by which knowledge is 
gained is one of assimilation and accretion. New ideas in­
duce a much required reorganization of the mental filing case 
one has been using to classify the factors involved.^9 Unless 
this reorganization is done the problem is complicated by 
what amounts to a form of existing hidden prejudices. In this
29Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chi­
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 313.
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chapter, for example, the concept of "the market" was re­
defined. This made possible the re-examination of the rela­
tion of freight absorption to the demand schedule faced by 
the spatial monopolist and the presentation of a spatial 
economic location theory.
Meyers has suggested the need for a more relevant 
level of economic knowledge with which to confront the issues 
of the right-to-work controversy.30 Spatial economic location 
theory is of that level. Should this comprehensive location 
theory become more generally understood and adopted, then 
the union security controversy, in which the right-to-work 
issue is one facet, would be one step closer to solution.
SUMMARY
In Chapter V it was pointed out that the anticipated 
benefits to accrue from the passage of right-to-work laws 
emphasized advantages in production costs. It was then 
pointed out that the demand side of the problem was not even 
mentioned. Several sociological and psychological reasons 
for this emphasis on costs were then suggested as adapted 
from the work of William G. Bowen. In addition it was sug- 
gested^that misapplication of theory or inadequacy of theory
onJWMeyers, op. ext., p. 46.
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might be the cause.
For the above reasons it was necessary briefly to re­
state location theory. The least-cost approach to location 
theory was shown to be based on assumptions of perfect com­
petition, and this was illustrated with discussions of the 
works of von Thttnen, Weber, and Hoover. The market area- 
locational interdependence approach was shown to be based on 
assumptions of monopolistic competition in a spatial economy. 
It was then shown how this approach could give theoretical 
answers to the questions of minimumv and maximum size market 
areas and how considerations of space affected market shape. 
The monopolistic characteristics of the profit maximizing 
nondiscriminatory f.o.b. mill price were explained. Finally 
the agglomerating and deglomerating effects of the relation­
ships of two sets of variables were explored: (1) the rela­
tionship between the spatial monopolist's marginal cost and 
demand functions, and (2) the relationship between his freight 
cost and demand functions.
The least-cost and market area-locational interdepen­
dence approaches were then shown to be the two parts of the 
maximum-profit location theory, and the relative importance 
of all the factors involved was then discussed in relation to 
(1) sellers facing a perfectly competitive market, and (2)
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sellers facing an imperfectly competitive market.
It was then concluded that the disparity between the 
advocacy of the right-to-work laws before the fact, and the 
practice under the laws after the fact, was part of the 
"puzzlement of society" and that the right-to-work controversy 
was not merely symbolic but symptomatic of an unsolved prob­
lem. The advocates of right-to-work laws were basing their 
policy decisions on an incomplete location theory that is 
now recognized to be only production theory. They had failed 
to synthesize monopolistic and competitive theory.
It was finally concluded that should spatial economic 
location theory become more generally understood and adopted, 
then the union security controversy, in which the right-to- 
work issue is one facet, would be one step closer to solution.
i
CHAPTER VI
RIGHT-TO-WORK AND PLANT LOCATION PRACTICE 
THE NEED TO COMPARE THEORY WITH PRACTICE
In Chapter V preceding, the idea was developed that 
the seeming importance of right-to-work legislation stemmed 
from two causes: (1) a misapplication of location theory,
and (2) a failure to synthesize competitive and monopolistic 
theory and thus adapt it to present day conditions. It was 
pointed out that least-cost location theory ignores the de­
mand side of the market completely and that reduction of 
labor costs is only one of many cost reduction possibilities.
It was concluded that one reason that so many business­
men pay only lip service to the right-to-work laws once they 
are passed, is that they have discovered that when possible, 
aggressive exploitation of the spatial advantages of the 
demand side of the market yields greater rewards than a like 
expenditure of effort on defensive cost reduction tactics in 
which the right-to-work effort is only a part.
In this chapter is indicated the extent to which this
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is so, and the relative importance of right-to-work laws in 
location decisions.
THE SOUTHERN STUDY
Glenn E. McLaughlin and Stefan Robock, as part of the 
Committee of the South of the National Planning Association, 
conducted a study entitled Why Industry Moves South'1' investi­
gating the factors influencing the location of manufacturing 
plants in the South. The study was motivated by a desire to 
help the South. They conducted interviews with more than 
fifty manufacturing concerns which were responsible for estab­
lishing eighty-eight new plants in the South between the 
close of World War II and June, 1949, the date of the report.
In Appendix C of this report they describe what they 
have found to be the general pattern of procedures followed 
by companies in selecting plant locations. They point out 
that some businessmen are faced by the problem of plant loca­
tion infrequently and therefore have little experience in 
such matters. It is not surprising then that such business 
location decisions are sometimes poor. Other companies which 
frequently face the problem of the establishment of new plants
•^Glenn E. McLaughlin, and Stefan Robock, Why Industry 
Moves South, The National Planning Association, Washington,
D. C., 1949.
have been able to do an outstanding job. Companies usually 
handle the problem within their own organization, although 
some engage outside companies to do all or part of the loca­
tion work.
The first step is a preliminary analysis of the market. 
The company conducts market research to get information on 
the geographical distribution of the prospective customers.
It is determined whether the plant will supply an export, 
national, regional, or local market. The exact location of 
the market is determined as well as whether demand is concen­
trated at one point or scattered over a wide area. The 
company then derives estimates of the quantity of the product 
it can sell to this market under the various conditions of 
demand.
In describing this first step, McLaughlin and Robock 
make these comments.
A new plant will be considered only when market 
research reveals sufficient demand to support an 
economic sized plant. . . .  In each case there is a 
definite market territory to be supplied by a new 
plant and this market is a fixed factor in the loca­
tion problem. In order to understand any plant loca­
tion decision the market involved must be known..2
It is important to note that the first step taken in
^Ibid., p. 139
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the general procedure of attacking a plant location problem 
as actually done in practice is an investigation of the 
market side of the location problem with all the implications 
of locational interdependence and monopolistic advantages in 
a spatial economy which were described previously in Chapter 
V. In addition it is the most important step because on the 
basis of this first investigation the decision is made whether 
to enter the market or stay out. McLaughlin and Robock see 
this process and describe it, yet they do not recognize it 
for what it is. To them the locational problem begins with 
the long run position of the firm when all costs are variable 
and nothing is fixed. The first step merely defines "the 
market" which then becomes a fixed factor in the locational 
problem as it moves to a shorter term point of view. Their 
analysis of Why Industry Moves South is in reality a least- 
cost analysis. In the beginning of their study this is made 
clear by their statement:
Some of the conclusions of this study are contrary 
to presently accepted notions. Many economists may 
be surprised by the simple theoretical pattern pre­
sented, and many laymen may find it hard to believe 
that anything but "cheap" labor was important in 
attracting industry to the South.3
According to McLaughlin and Robock, the second step in
3Ibid., p. 7.
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the procedure of locating a plant is a formulation of a de­
tailed list of requirements: land, buildings, materials,
labor, transportation facilities, and local services. The 
minimum requirements of the plant are determined and the 
location checked to see if these minimum requirements can be 
met, and what the possibilities for substitution are.
McLaughlin and Robock do not mention it, but undoubt­
edly costs are part of the considerations in this second step. 
It is important to note, however, that the emphasis is not on 
costs, but on the possibility of physical production to meet 
the expected market.
The third step, according to McLaughlin and Robock, is 
to check the attributes of possible locations, such as the 
town's living conditions, recreational facilities, whether it 
is urban or rural, the possibility of hiring Negroes, women, 
or other specialized labor, and general community attitudes 
as they apply to company policies and preferences (this 
could include a company policy to avoid unionism for non­
economic reasons, or if all other conditions were equal to 
avoid unionism for economic reasons). These considerations 
may result in the choice of a location which would be con­
sidered irrational from an economic point of view. It is 
explained that from the economic point of view such choices
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are luxuries which cannot be afforded in industries that are 
highly competitive, but that in industries where there is a 
profit margin (presumably as a result of monopolistic ele­
ments) companies can select such locations and still continue 
to exist.4
THE MICHIGAN INDUSTRIAL MOBILITY STUDY
The Institute for Social Research of the University of 
Michigan conducted a study in 1950, the purpose of which was 
to find the best possible way to promote Michigan and to ad­
vance the state's industrial position in the nation.5 Execu­
tives of two hundred manufacturing plants were interviewed 
about their location needs and their attitudes toward location 
factors. The sample was chosen to eliminate the immobile 
industries, and to eliminate both the giant corporations and 
the very small plants with less than twelve employees. Three- 
fourths of the sample represented Michigan's three major 
industries: (1) manufacturers of metal products; (2) manu­
facturers of furniture and fixtures; and (3) the chemical 
industry. The other fourth was a miscellaneous group of
4Ibid., pp. 137-40.
^Institute for Social Research, "Industrial Mobility 
in Michigan," Michigan University, December, 1950.
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industries. The results were also weighted by size groups 
so that they would be representative of the number of persons 
employed.
Those firms which indicated that they contemplated 
either a removal from Michigan or the establishing of a branch 
plant elsewhere were asked their reasons for considering
i
moving. They gave four reasons, all disadvantages of a 
Michigan location: (1) the desire to be nearer to materials
(steel in particular)?-(2) the need to be nearer markets;
(3) to have good transport facilities and low transport costs; 
and (4) to have a good labor situation (a condition which 
right-to-work advocates say their proposals encourage and 
implement). These four main disadvantages seemed to be of 
about equal importance. Taxes and a desire to decentralize 
were also mentioned but seemed to be of minor importance.
The study qualified the above finding by stating that 
the. number of plants considering expansion elsewhere was not 
large, that the number of plants whose executives were think­
ing about moving out was small, and the number with actual 
moving plans was smaller still; and in many cases where high 
wages or difficulties with organized labor was given as a
6Ibid., p. 18.
125
reason for moving or expanding elsewhere, the serving of 
other market areas or getting closer to materials was also 
given as a reason. The study concluded that, in general, 
high wages as well as taxes seemed to be of much less impor­
tance in actual migration of industry than they were as per­
vasive irritants.7
The interviewers' major findings concerning the ad­
vantages of Michigan which made it a desirable place to 
locate were: (1) the plant owners wanted to be located
first, close to their markets, and second, close to their 
sources of materials; (2) Michigan was given a high rating 
on the proximity to market criterion; (3) Michigan had no 
special advantage in respect to the distance from materials 
criterion; (4) about one-fourth of the persons interviewed 
saw an advantage in their labor situation in Michigan, 
especially in regard to skill, productivity, and attitude^— 
disadvantageous labor situations were largely confined to 
the City of Detroit and were not state wide; (5) there were 
two main reasons given why plants had moved to Michigan—  
the first was to be near their market, usually the automobile 
industry, and the second was a personal preference for Michi­
gan as a place by the executives making the location decision.8
#
7Ibid., p. 29 ®Ibid., p. 30.
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The above findings of the Michigan study again dis­
close actual business practices which seem to confirm the 
Chamberlinian conclusion. It also seems to indicate that 
the presence of high labor costs is just one (although perhaps 
the most important one) of many cost based locational dis­
advantages considered by a firm, but that positive advantages 
on the demand side of a location make firms willing to endure 
the labor cost disadvantage, in which case it remains as a 
pervasive irritant.
THE NEW YORK AREA STUDY OP JOHN I. GRIFFIN 
.In 1955 John I. Griffin conducted a study which he
gcalled Industrial Location in the New York Area for the New 
York Area Research Council of the City College of New York.
The stated purposes of the study were to interpret 
industrial patterns, to identify the larger firms in the New 
York area, to reveal through a questionnaire and interview 
program attitudes towards locational factors, and finally, 
to consider some issues of policy concerning these attitudes 
and the out-migration of industry.
The New York area in the study included fifteen
9 John I. Griffin, Industrial Location in the New York 
Area (New York: The City College Press, 1956).
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counties of the New York Metropolitan Region and encompassed 
91 per cent of the population, 90 per cent of the manufac­
turing employment, and 95 per cent of the manufacturing firms 
in the entire New York Metropolitan Region as defined by the 
Regional Plan Association. Prom the Industrial Directory of 
the New York State Department of Commerce, he was able to . 
identify 2,582 firms employing 100 persons or more. These 
he classified by county, industry and employment size, and 
mailed a questionnaire to a systematic 50 per cent sample of 
these firms. He received a 25 per cent response to his 
mailing, with the response weighted in the direction of the 
larger firms.
The questionnaire listed thirty-three locational 
factors, and the firms were asked to classify these factors 
as advantages or disadvantages and to rate them in each class 
in the order of their importance as locational factors in the 
respective county in which the firm was located.
Griffin scored the answers by county and determined 
a mean score for each locational factor. He gave each factor 
listed by a firm as the most important favorable factor a +50, 
each second most important favorable' factor a +40, each third 
most important favorable factor a +30, each fourth most impor­
tant favorable factor a +20, each fifth most important
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favorable factor a +10, and he did not go any deeper. The 
unfavorable factors, he scored the same way except to assign 
negative values, with the most important unfavorable factor 
scoring -50. The values for each factor were added alge­
braically and divided by the number of responses to that 
factor to get a mean score.
\
Griffin then added these mean scores on all the factors 
algebraically by counties and got a score for each county.
He interpreted the results as indicating, on a comparative 
basis, the attitudes of the responding firms toward their 
present locations. A high positive score would indicate that 
a county was a good location area, while a low or even nega­
tive score would indicate that the county was a poor location 
area.10
Griffin was not interested in the relative importance 
of the locational factors and so made no attempt to determine 
this, but if his scores for each locational factor by county 
are added algebraically, the results will indicate Whether 
the factor is an advantage or a disadvantage, depending upon 
whether its score is positive or negative. In addition its 
relative importance can be calculated, at least for the New
10Ibid., pp. 41-78.
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York area, by setting the most important factor equal to one 
and scaling the values of the other factors proportionately.
This has been done for this study in Table VI. From 
this table it can be seen that the most important factor is 
the advantage of access to markets. The six most important 
factors are all advantages of the location, and four of these 
six pertain to the demand side of the firm's locational prob­
lems, access to markets, distribution facilities, railroad 
facilities, and truck facilities. The other two of the first 
six advantage factors pertain to the possibility of physical 
production to meet the expected demand: factory buildings 
and room for expansion. The pattern seems to correspond to 
McLaughlin and Robock's findings in the South.
If only those location factors which have an associ­
ation with unionism are selected for appraisal, it can be 
seen that there are eight factors more important than wages, 
which is considered a disadvantage only 35 per cent as 
important as the most important factor, and seven of those 
eight factors are location advantages.
Fringe benefits are sometimes considered to be a con­
comitant- of unionism. In the table, the fringe benefits 
factor has an unfavorable locational importance of only 25.2 
pe»tcent of the most important factor and it is seventeenth
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TABLE VI
GRIFFIN'S LOCATION FACTORS CLASSIFIED AND RATED
No. Class Rate Factor
1. a 1.000 Access to markets
2. a .832 Factory buildings
3. a . .466 Distribution facilities
4. a .462 Railroad facilities
5. a .443 Room for expansion
6. a .434 Truck facilities
7. d -.364 Taxes in general
8. a .363 Rent
9. d -.350 Wacres
10. d -.313 Parking and traffic conditions
11. a .306 Availability of raw material
12. d -.293 Workmen's compensation costs
13. d -.280 Municipal taxes
14. a .263 Supply of unskilled labor
15. d -.262 Real estate taxes
16. a .261 Supply of skilled labor
17. d -.252 Fringe benefits
18. d -.192 Air polution
19. d -.175 Local laws and regulations
20. d -.154 Waste disposal
21. d -.141 Attitudes of local government offi­
cials
22. d -.138 State taxes
23. a .096 Supply of electric power
24. d -.096 Industrial fuel supplies “
25. d -.094 Local union attitudes
26. a .093 Supply of water
27. a .075 Waterway facilities
28. d -.073 Local promotion of industry
29. d -.069 Personal property tax
30. d -.062 Quality of police and fire services
31. d -.057 Labor relations
32. a .035 Airline facilities
33. a .018 Other advantages mentioned
Source: John I. Griffin# Industrial Location in the
New York Area# The City College Press# New York City# 1956.
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in a list of thirty-three locational factors.
Local union attitudes and labor relations are both 
considered unfavorable locational factors, but they only 
have a value of 9.4 per cent and 5.7 per cent respectively, 
of the most important factor, and are twenty-fifth and thirty- 
fir fet in importance in a field of thirty-three.
Finally, it can be seen that there are several other 
locational factors, both favorable and unfavorable, which 
are not related to unionism, but which are at least as 
important to locational decision making as unionism.
Because the technique of this analysis permits only 
the most tentative conclusions, the results should be con­
sidered only as exemplary and indicative even though they 
are esqpressed in numerical terms. They do, however, indicate 
the relative importance and effects of the factors listed, 
at least in the New York area from which they were drawn. By 
a similar technique information could be gained for other 
areas if the applicability of this particular study is ques­
tioned, and such information should be reliable enough for 
use as a basis for policy in attracting industry.
132
SUMMARY
In Chapter IV, it was shown that, in effect, many 
businessmen advocate and support right-to-work legislation, 
but only pay lip service to the laws once they are passed.
In Chapter V, it was shown why this was so. It was shown 
that the locational theory subscribed to by these business­
men was inadequate, and a more complete theory was outlined 
in an attempt to better explain their locational decisions 
and so indicate what the impact of right-to-work laws should 
be expected to be.
Chapter VI presented empirical evidence supporting the 
theory outlined in Chapter V. The Southern study of McLaugh­
lin and Robock was presented to show that those researchers 
had seen the process described in the theory outlined in 
Chapter V of this study, and they had described it. They did 
not recognize it for what it was, but their description gave 
support to the more complete theory of location. The Michigan 
industrial mobility study was presented and analyzed. This 
study also indicated that in practice, businessmen did what 
the more complete locational theory presented in Chapter V 
had indicated. The New York study of John I. Griffin was 
presented and figures were developed from that study which 
indicated quantitatively what the relative impact of right-to-
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work legislation could be expected to be upon the locational 
decisions of businessmen, at least in the New York area.
It is concluded that, in theory and in practice, the 
market considerations are the most important of all the eco­
nomic locating factors to most firms, and the presence or 
absence' of right-to-work legislation does not have any rele­
vance to the analysis of the market for the products of the 
firm. It follows that the presence or absence of right-to-
work legislation cannot be expected to have any direct im-
\
pact on the locational decision of a firm through its analysis 
of the market. The presence or absence of right-to-work laws 
may have an indirect impact on the locational decision, how­
ever, if the market analysis discloses favorable enough 
conditions to allow the firm to avoid unionism for non­
economic reasons.
If, as both sides to the right-to-work controversy 
allege, the right-to-work laws do hinder union organization 
and effectiveness and so cause a reduction in costs, this is 
only one of many factors affecting the locational decision of 
a firm through its analysis of costs. It follows that in the 
type of industry where the firm faces a purely competitive 
market and where a favorable cost structure is necessary for
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profitable operation and even survival, right-to-work laws 
will have their greatest effect upon the location decision 
of the firm.
CHAPTER VII
THE EFFECTS OF RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS ON UNION 
ORGANIZATION: THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD STATISTICS
DO RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS REALLY AFFECT UNION ORGANIZATION?
Earlier in Chapter III of this study, it was estab­
lished that one of the purposes of right-to-work legislation 
was to impede union organization and effectiveness. It was 
stated several times that both the proponents and the oppo­
nents assume that this will be the result if the laws are 
passed.
In Chapters V and VI immediately preceding this chapter_ 
it was shown what the effects of right-to-work laws on indus­
trial growth might be expected to be if it is true, as both 
sides assume, that right-to-work laws do actually impede 
union organization and effectiveness and so reduce union 
bargaining power. It remains to be shown that such is actually 
the case.
In this chapter some statistics reported by the National 
Labor Relations Board in their annual reports have been com­
piled into tables suitable for the purposes of this study and
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analyzed to show the relation between right-to-work legisla­
tion and union organization, effectiveness and bargaining 
power as indicated by the filing of unfair labor practices 
charges and the results of employee representation elections.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES
The National Labor Relations Board has divided unfair 
labor practice cases brought under the Labor Management Rela­
tions Act of 1947, as amended, into six different types of 
cases. They are listed and described briefly as follows:
CA Cases: A charge of unfair labor practices against
an employer under Sec. 8(a). In general, CA cases are those 
brought against an employer for proscribed anti-union, anti­
union employee, activity in the usual employer-employee-union 
relationship.
CB Cases: A charge of unfair labor practices against
a labor organization under Sec. 8(b)(1), (2), (3), (5), (6). 
In general, CB cases are those, brought against a union to 
prevent discrimination against an individual or an employer 
or the exacting of money from an employer for work not done 
or not to be done, in the usual employer-employee-union rela­
tionship .
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CC Cases: A charge of unfair labor practices against
a labor organization under Sec. 8 (b)(4)(i)(A), (B), (e). In 
general, CC cases prohibit unions from striking or refusing 
to handle certain goods or services where the object is to 
force their own employer or another employer to join an em­
ployer's association, or to force another employer to recog­
nize an uncertified union as the representative of his em­
ployees.
CD Cases; A charge of unfair labor practices against 
a labor organization under Sec. 8 (b)(4)(i)(D). In general,
CD cases prohibit one union from striking in order to get 
work assigned to its members instead of to members, of another 
union. This section prohibits jurisdictional strikes.
CE Cases: A charge of unfair labor practices against
both a labor organization and an employer under Sec. 8(e).
In general, CE cases prohibit union-employer agreements not 
to use the goods or services of another employer, a type of 
secondary boycott.
CP Cases: A charge of unfair labor practices against
a labor organization under Sec. 8 (b) (7)<(A), (B), (C). In
general, where a union has been certified as the representa­
tive and may not be challenged under the Act, CP cases prohibit:
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picketing by another union where the object is (1) to force 
an employer to recognize the picketing union as the repre­
sentative of his employees, or (2) to force the employees 
to accept the picketing union as their representative.
In its annual reports,1 the National Labor Relations 
Board gives the geographical distribution by states of all 
unfair labor practices cases received during the fiscal year. 
The series is complete for all CA, CB, CC and CD type cases 
from 1949, the first full year after the passage of the Act, 
through 1961. CE and CP type cases originated with the 1959 
amendment, and the series only goes back two years. Table
At
VII gives the distribution of all the CA, CB, CC, and CD 
type cases.
In the discussion which follows, only CA and CB type 
cases are considered. There are several reasons for this. 
First, the CA and CB type cases are those which involve 
direct contact in a union management dispute. CC cases in­
volve indirect action, and CD cases are not related to the 
problem at hand. Second, the bulk of the cases are of the CA 
and CB types. CC cases make up an average of less than eight 
cases per state per year, and CD cases make up an average of
United States, Annual Reports of the National Labor 
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Source: United States, Annual Reports of the National
Labor Relations Board, U. S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D. C.
less than three cases per state per year. The data as to 
these CC and CD type cases is too discrete to disclose any 
tendencies from which a meaningful conclusion can be drawn, 
v and too small to affect conclusions based on CA and CB type 
cases alone.
Table VIII shows the geographic distribution of CA and 
CB unfair labor practices cases by number and as a per cent 
of the total CA and CB cases for each state. Alaska and 
Hawaii were excluded to avoid introducing any aberration 
resulting from remoteness or new statehood. Washington, D. C. 
was included because it is geographically integrated but
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TABLE VIII
CA AND CB UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES (IN 48 STATES AND 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA) BY NUMBER AND PER CENT
1949-1961
State Total CA Per Cent CA CB
Per Cei 
CB
United States 84,836 65,438 77.0 19,398 22.8
Maine*3 276 237 86.0 39 22.8
New Hampshire*3 170 155 91.2 15 8.8
Vermont*3 116 111 95.8 5 4.3
Massachusetts*3 2,480 2,016 81.0 464 18.7
Rhode Island*3 405 316 78.0 89 22.0
Connecticut*3 917 787 85.7 130 14.3
New York 11,542 8,183 71.0 3,359 29.2
New Jersey 3,321 2,498 75.1 823 24.8
Pennsylvania 5,029 3,577 73.1 1,352 26.8
Ohio*3 , 4,624 3,632 78.2 992 21.5
Indiana3 2,736 2,108 77.0 628 22.8
Illinois 5,362 4,104 76.7 1,258 23.4
Michigan*3 4,136 3,324 80.5 812 19.6
Wisconsin*3 987 869 88.0 118 12.0
Iowa3*3 415 380 91.5 35 8.4
Minnesota*3 565 480 84.8 85 15.1
Missouri*3 3,176 2,524 79.5 652 20.5
North Dakota3*3 97 94 97.0 3 3.1
South Dakota3*3 62 62 100.0 0 0
Nebraska3*3 451 380 84.2 71 15.8
Kansas3*3 616 527 85.5 89 14.5
Delaware 180 137 76.2 43 23.8
Maryland 976 719 73.6 257 26.4
Dist. of Col. 333 248 74.6 85 25.5
Virginia3*3 943 852 90.4 91 9.7
West Virginia 998 714 71.4 284 28.4
North Carolina3*3!, 571 1,483 94.2 88 5.6
So. Carolina3*3 432 388 89.7 44 10.2
Georgia3 1,926 1,484 77.0 442 23.0
Florida3*3 3,574 2,890 80.8 684 19.1
Kentucky 1,289 898 69.5 391 30.4
Tennessee3*3 2,293 1,786 78.0 507 22.0
Alabama3 1,598 1,189 74.8 409 25.2
TABLE VIII (CONTINUED)
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Louisiana 1,691 1,237 73.1 454 26.8
Oklahoma*5 523 472 90.2 51 9.8
Texas3*5 3,092 2,514 81.2 578 18.7
Montana 282 213 75.5 69 24.5
Idaho*5 362 331 91.5 31 8.6
Wyoming*5 174 145 83.2 29 16.7
Colorado*5 1,047 897 85.6 150 14.3
New Mexico 619 471 76.2 148 23.8
Arizona3*5 409 329 80.5 80 19.6
Utah3*5 173 150 86.7 '23 13.3
Nevada3 104 76 73.0 28 26.9
Washington 2,000 1,414 70.7 586 29.3
Oregon*5 1,288 1,050 81.4 238 18.5
California 8,386 5,922 70.8 2,464 29.3
aRight-to-work states.
bCA cases above the National per cent.
Source: United States, Annual Reports of the National
Labor Relations Board, U. S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D. C.
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Federally administered, and it was desired to see if Federal 
control made any difference.
From an examination of Table VIII it can be seen that 
fifteen of the right-to-work states are above the national 
average in the ratio of CA cases to the total CA and CB cases. 
Two right-to-work states are equal to the national average, 
and two are below the national average. This is in contrast 
to sixteen non-right-to-work states being above the national 
average while fifteen fall below. This would seem to indi­
cate that there is some relationship between the enactment of 
right-to-work laws and the ratio of the number of unfair 
labor practices cases brought against employers to the number 
of unfair labor practices cases brought against unions.
There are several possibilities. The proportionate
number of CA cases in a state could be higher than the
\
national average both before and after the passage of right- 
to-work laws, in which case it would be a reflection of a 
relatively more hostile anti-union attitude on the part of 
management in that state.
The proportionate number of CA cases in a state could 
increase over the national average after the passage of right- 
to-work laws in that state. The change in proportion could 
be caused by a relative increase in CA cases denoting a more
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active hostile anti-union attitude on the part of management, 
or the change could be caused by a relative decrease in CB 
cases denoting a less militant attitude on the part of the 
unions.
The proportionate number of CA cases in a state could 
decrease compared to the national average after the passage 
of right-to-work laws in a state. This change in proportion 
could be caused by a relative decrease in CA cases signifying 
a less hostile anti-union attitude on the part of management, 
or there could be a relative increase in CB cases denoting 
more militant union action.
Finally, the total of CA plus CB cases could increase 
or decrease in proportion to the national average, signifying 
a disruption or a furtherance of industrial peace.
Statistics with which to check the above possibilities 
are available for only seven states: Nevada, Alabama, South
Carolina, Mississippi, Utah, Indiana, and Kansas. They are 
shown in Table IX below.
In Table IX the figures for each state and for the 
United States are divided according to the end of the year in 
which right-to-work laws became effective. This is shown as 
a before and after division. It can be seen from the column 
entitled "Per Cent of U.S. Total" that in four of the seven
TABLE IX
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Total










U.S. to 1952 19,909 16,508 3,401 82.9
U.S. from 1953 64,927 48,930 15,997 75.5 -11.2
Nev. to 1952 8 .0403 5 3 62.5 .0304 .0880
Nev. from 1953 96 .148 71 25 73.9 +18.2 .145 .156
U.S. to 1953 24,915 20,738 4,177 83.1
U.S. from 1954 59,921 44,700 15,221 74.6 -10.2
Ala. to 1953 301 .121 257 44 85.5 1.24 1.06
Ala. from 1954 1,297 .216 932 365 72.0 -15.8 2.08 2.40
U.S. to 1954 30,321 24,941 5,380 82.2
U.S. from 1955 54,515 40,497 14,018 74.2 - 9.7
S.C. to 1954 174 .572 164 10 94.2 - .658 .186
see. from 1955 258 .473 224 34 86.7 - 8.0 .555 .243
Miss. to 1954 157 .517 143 14 91.1 .572 .262
Miss. from 1955 340 .623 288 52 85.0 - 6.7 .712 .371
U.S. to 1956 35,936 29,199 6,737 81.2
U.S. from 1957 48,900 36,239 12,661 74.1 - 8.7
Utah to 1956 80 .223 69 11 86.2 .237 .164
Utah from 1957 93 .190 81 12 87.1 + 1.4 .224 .0946
U.S. to 1957 45,246 - 36,164 9,082 79.8
U.S. from 1958 39,590 29,274 10,316 73.8 - 7.5
Ind. to 1957 1,419 3.13 1,126 293 79.3 3.12 3.23
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Total










U.S. to 1958 53,512 42,024 11,488 78.4 —
U.S. from 1959 31,324 23,414 7,910 74.8 - 4.6
Kan. to 1958 409 .765 356 53 87.0 .843 .462
Kan. from 1959 207 .662 171 36 82.5 - 5.2 .730 .455
•
Source: United States, Annual Reports of the National Labor Relations Board, U. S.




states, unfair labor practices cases of both types became a 
greater proportion of the national total after the passage 
of right-to-work laws, and in three of the states it became 
less. It cannot be shown from this that right-to-work laws 
disrupted or furthered industrial peace.
Prom the column entitled "Per Cent CA" it can be seen 
that with the exception of Nevada and Utah, the two states 
with a very small number of cases, the percentage of CA type 
cases declined in the national figures and five of the states 
shown followed the general pattern. Each state's CA cases 
were figured as a per cent of the national total of CA cases 
both before and after right-to-work legislation, and each 
state's CB cases were figured as a per cent of the national 
total CB cases both before and after. This was done in an 
attempt to detect any kind of pattern. None was detected; 
in fact, the two states that did not follow the national 
pattern in the "Relative Per Cent Change" departed for dif­
ferent reasons: Nevada because of an excess of CA cases and
Utah because of a deficiency of CB cases. In Table EC, no 
change traceable to the passage of right-to-work laws could 
be found.
In this analysis of Unfair Labor Practices Cases there 
was discovered just one tendency which was noted in Table
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VIII. In the right-to-work states, taken as a whole, CA 
cases constitute 81.8 per cent of the total of both CA and 
CB cases. This, is higher than the national average of 77.0 
per cent. The passage of right-to-work laws seems not to 
affect this tendency. This suggests the pre-existence of an 
anti-union attitude in those states which perhaps contributed 
toward the enactment of the right-to-work proposals into law.
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION ELECTION RESULTS
Under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and the 
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 and the 1959 Amend­
ments, there is a provision for a government supervised 
election in which employees can elect to be represented by a 
union or not to be represented by a union. They also cam. 
choose the union they want as their representative. The 
majority choice prevails and if a union is selected it becomes 
the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargain­
ing unit. The National Labor Relations Board is charged with 
the conducting of these elections.
In its annual reports, the National Labor Relations 
Board gives the geographical distribution by states of all 
elections conducted by it during the fiscal year with the 
results of those elections. The series is complete for the
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years 1946 through 1961 for the breakdown showing whether 
the employees chose to be represented by a union or chose 
not to be represented by a union. Table X below shows the 
number of elections held by states (Alaska and Hawaii ex­
cluded and Washington D. C. included, for the reasons given 
in the previous discussion of unfair labor practices cases), 
the number of these elections which resulted in a decision 
of employees not to be represented by a union, and the per­
centage of the total number of elections which resulted in a 
decision not to be represented by a union.
Prom an examination of Table X it can be seen that in 
fifteen of the right-to-work states a proportionately greater 
number of representation elections resulted in a choice of 
no union than the national average, and in four of the right- 
to-work states a proportionately smaller number of these 
elections resulted in a choice of no union. This is in con­
trast to the results in non-right-to-work states where in 
thirteen states the decision not to be represented by a union 
was higher than the national average while one was the same 
as the national average and sixteen were below the national 
average. This would seem to indicate that there is some
relationship between the enactment of right-to-work laws and*
the percentage of representation elections which result in
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TABLE X
NLRB REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS AND RESULTS (IN 48 STATES 
AND DISTRICT OP COLUMBIA), 1946-1961
Per CentState Total No Union No union
United States 85.152 27 ,166 31.9
Maine*3 422 165 39.0
New Hampshire*3 374 156 41.7
Vermont*3 218 84 38.4
Massachusetts 3,277 995 30.4
Rhode Island 595 189 31.8
Connecticut*3 1,171 389 33.3
New York 8,043 2,113 26.3
New Jersey 3,646 967 26.5
Pennsylvania 5,440 1, 674 30.8
Ohio 6,133 1 ,938 31.5
Indiana9*3 2,654 911 34.3
Illinois 5,356 1,702 31.8
Michigan 4,164 1,281 30.8
Wisconsin 1,963 528 26.8
Iowaa 1,135 338 29.8
Minnesota 1,850 483 26.1
Missouri 3,579 897 24.9
No. Dakota9*3 307 101 32.8
So. Dakota9*3 210 75 35.6
Nebraska9*3 673 268 39.8
Kansas9 1,001 313 31.3
Delaware 190 50 26.3
Maryland*3 1,207 482 39.8
Dist. of Columbia 494 163 33.3
Virginia9*3 1,239 435 35.0
West Virginia*3 731 272 33.8
No. Carolina9*3 1,161 534 45.9
So. Carolina9*3 345 137 39.8
Georgia9*3 1,378 550 39.6
Florida9*3 1,560 629 40.3
Kentucky*3 1,246 477 38.2
Tennessee9*3 1,773 / 701 39.5











State Total No Union Per Cent No Union
Louisiana13 1,184 418 35.4
Oklahoma13 913 379 41.5
Texasal3 3,389 1,180 35.0
Montana 241 77 31.9
Idaho 383 107 27.8
Wyoming13 161 61 37.8
Colorado 1,332 411 30.8
New Mexico 414 127 30.7
Arizona5 526 143 27.3
Utahab 323 121 37.4
Nevada5 101 17 17.0
Washington 1,310 297 22.6
Oregon13 1,364 439 32.0
California13 7,475 2,482 33.3
aRight-to-work states.
bNo union results above the national average.
Source: United States, Annual Reports of the National
Labor Relations Board, U. S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D. C.
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a decision not to be represented by a union.
There are several possibilities. The proportion of 
no-union decisions could be higher than the national average 
both before and after the passage of right-to-work laws, in 
which case it would be a reflection of an existing social 
attitude in these states towards unionism.
The proportion of no-union decisions in a state could 
increase after the passage of right-to-work legislation.
This would be an indication that right-to-work laws do hinder 
union organization.
The proportion of no-union decisions in a state could 
decrease after the passage of right-to-work legislation. This 
might be an indication that employee response to union organ­
ization efforts was more favorable perhaps as a reaction to 
an anti-union management, or it might indicate a more cautious 
attitude on the part of unions in not asking for elections in 
cases where a loss was indicated as the probable outcome. A 
change in the proportionate number of total cases might serve 
to indicate which of these was the case.
Statistics with which to check the above possibili­
ties are available for only seven states— Nevada, Alabama, 
South Carolina, Mississippi, Utah, Indiana, and Kansas. They 
are analyzed in Table XI.
TABLE XI
REPRESENTATION ELECTION RESULTS IN SEVEN RIGHT TO WORK STATES, 1946-1961
Elections
Per Cent 
of U. S. 
Total





U.S. to 1952 39,331 10,176 25.8
U.S. from 1953 45,821 16,990 37.1 +43.7
Nev. to 1952 39 .0996 6 15.4
Nev. from 1953 63 .137 11 17.5 +13.6
U.S. to 1953 45,185 11,834 26.2
U.S. from 1954 39,967 15,332 38.3 +46.2
Ala. 1 to 1953 579 1.28 185 32.0
Ala. from 1954 436 1.09 209 48.0 +50.0
U.S. to 1954 49,692 13,396 27.1
U.S. from 1955 35,460 13,770 38.8 +44.3
S.C. to 1954 229 .461 80 34.8
s.c. from 1955 116 .328 57 49.1 +41.1
Miss. to 1954 308 .620 112 36.3
Miss. from 1955 171 .482 91 53.3 +46.8
U.S. to 1956 53,824 14,738 27.3
U.S. from 1957 31,328 12,428 39.9 +46.2
Utah to 1956 195 .362 60 30.7
Utah from 1957 128 .408 61 47.6 +55.1
U.S. to 1957 63,317 18,192 28.7
U.S. from 1958 21,835 8,974 41.0 +42.8
Ind. to 1957 2,064 3.25 665 32.3





of U. S. 
Total





U.S. to 1958 67,588 19,879 29.4
U.S. from 1959 17,564 7,287 41.4 +41.0
Kan. to 1958 810 1.20 236 29.2
Kan. from 1959 191 1.09 77 40.3 + 38.0
Source: United States, Annual Reports of the National Labor Relations
Board, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.
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Prom an examination of Table XI it can be seen that 
the relative number of elections resulting in a choice of no­
union by the employees is increasing in the United States. 
That is, the percentage of no-union: elections results is 
higher in every case for the more recent years. This is 
true also for the seven right-to-work states shown. Further,, 
from the "Relative Per Cent Change" column it can be seen 
that the right-to-work states as a whole are following the 
national pattern with four of them increasing at a slightly 
slower rate than the national rate and three of them in­
creasing at a slightly faster rate.
Table XI shows that unions win proportionately more 
elections in Nevada and Kansas than the national average and 
they lose proportionately more in Alabama, South Carolina, 
Mississippi, Utah, and Indiana.
An examination of the column "Per Cent of U. S. Total" 
discloses that in all the seven states except Nevada and Utah,
the total number of representation elections declined as a
\
proportion of the national total after the passage of right- 
to-work laws. Remembering that in Table IX in the "Per Cent 
CA" column, it was also Nevada and Utah that did not follow 
the national pattern of a declining percentage of CA type 
unfair labor practices cases. A search was made for a
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reason for this apparent correlation. None was found.
In this analysis of representation elections there was 
just one tendency discovered which was noted in Table X. 
Right-to-work states, taken as a whole, have an average of 
36.5 per cent of their representation elections result in a 
choice of nonunion. This is higher than the national average 
of 31^9 per cent. The passage of right-to-work laws seems 
not to affect this tendency. It might be concluded that 
this indicates the pre-existence of an anti-union attitude 
in those states which perhaps contributed toward the enact-, 
ment of the right-to-work proposals into law.
SUMMARY
Chapter VII is an attempt to find an indication of 
some effect of the right-to-work laws on union organization 
and industrial peace in the states which have enacted them.
In this chapter the statistics of the National Labor Rela­
tions Board concerning unfair labor practices cases and con­
cerning representation election results were compiled into 
tables and analyzed. These series were available from 1949 
through 1961 for the unfair labor practices cases and from 
1946 through 1961 for the representation elections results. 
These series showed the geographical distribution by state,
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so that each state could he compared with each other state 
and the national total for the time period covered, but the 
time period only went back far enough for a before and after 
analysis of seven right-to-work states.
/
This analysis disclosed that of the total cases brought 
against employers and against unions for unfair labor prac­
tices of the CA and CB types, in right-to-work states the 
proportion of the CA type (cases against employers) tended 
to be significantly higher than the national average, both 
before and after the passage of right-to-work laws, and in 
non-right-to-work states it did not.
It further disclosed that representation elections in 
right-to-work states tended to have a significantly higher 
proportion of no-union results than the national average, 
both before and after the passage of right-to-work laws, and
* i .
in non-right-to-work states they did not.
The analysis failed to disclose any significant change 
as the result of the passage of right-to-work laws,- but it 
did expose, in the total social environment, a pre-existing 
attitude in the states which now have right-to-work laws more 
antagonistic to union organization and activity than in non­
right- to-work states. Right-to-work laws are just one 
manifestation of this attitude.
CHAPTER VIII
THE EFFECTS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS ON UNION 
ORGANIZATION: THE DIRECT INQUIRY
THE NEED FOR DIRECT INQUIRY
This study was undertaken with the knowledge that 
there would be little published factual material regarding 
actual effects of right-to-work laws on union organization 
and that direct inquiry would be necessary. The following 
brief review of some of the existing published material 
shows where direct inquiry is most necessary for the pur­
poses of this study.
In his study on Texas labor relations, Meyers con­
cluded that in the traditional domain of the closed shop the 
passage of the right-to-work statute in Texas had a minimal 
effect, but he admitted that, peripherally, the statute'had 
had some effect in preventing the organization of certain 
unorganized crafts, particularly common laborers, when they 
worked beside organized trades.1 in the area of new union
•^Meyers, op. cit., p. 20.
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organization, he also concluded that the right-to-work statute 
had had minimal effect, in spite of the fact that many union­
ists and employers argued that a change had taken place 
because of the law. Again, he admitted that the general 
area in which the law might function meaningfully would en­
compass about six per cent of the total eligible employees in 
organized manufacturing bargaining units.2
Meyers also conceded that there were two indirect 
effects of the statute which concerned industrial peace: (1)
the statute may be used to emphasize an anti-union social 
atmosphere,  ̂ and (2) it has made the unions not more responsi­
ble, but more responsive to the demands of a tiny vocal 
minority of the membership.4 It remained his feeling, how­
ever, that the effects of "Right-To-Work" proposals on unions 
are minimal and are only a symbol because they mean so 
little.5
Beginning in 1913, there has existed in England a set 
of circumstances in which the effects of worker inertia can 
be seen in the membiership of the Labor Party. It is the 






An analogy can be drawn between the effects of worker inertia 
on the membership of the Labor Party in England under "con­
tracting out" and "contracting in" conditions and the effects 
of worker inertia on the membership of unions in the United 
States under compulsory unionism and right-to-work conditions.
Under the English 1913 Trade Disputes and Trade Unions 
Act unionists who had party allegiances other than to the 
Labor Party or who for other reasons did not wish to con­
tribute to the political funds of their unions were able to 
"contract out" of paying the political levy. The 1927 Act 
changed this so that members of unions who wished to pay the 
political levy had to "contract in" by signing a written under­
taking to this effect. The 1927 Act was repealed in 1946, • 
and the practice returned to "contracting out."
In 1920, under conditions of "contracting out," 52 per 
cent of the total membership of the trade unions were members 
of the Labor Party. In 1927, the last year of "contracting 
out," it was over 65 per cent. In 1928, under conditions of 
"contracting in," it fell to just under 42 per cent. By 1946, 
the last year of "contracting in," it fell to just under 30 
per cent. In 1947, the first year after the return to "con­
tracting out," the per cent of the total membership of the 
trade unions who were members of the Labor Party rose to more
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than 48 per cent, and by 1949 it had risen to 53 per cent.®
The inference raised by this analogy is that right-to- 
work laws by creating voluntary unionism can be expected to 
have more than a "minimal" effect on union organization, as 
suggested by Meyers, and that this needs investigating by the 
direct inquiry of this study.
There is one other published work, an article by James 
W. Kuhn,^ critical of Meyers' conclusions, which helps out­
line the scope of the needed inquiry. Kuhn points out two 
areas in which right-to-work laws may be expected to have 
more than "minimal" effects. The first is the voluntary 
recruitment of members. He finds that American workers have 
often displayed little or no initiative in taking out and 
maintaining union membership. There is evidence that some 
unions find the union shop not only a useful, but a necessary, 
device for recruiting many workers whose voluntary and eager 
support is lacking. Even the results of the union shop 
elections held under the Taft-Hartley provisions, although 
generally favorable with 97 per cent resulting in favor of
gAllan Flanders, "Great Britain," Comparative Labor 
Movements (ed. Walter Galenson, New York: Prentice Hall,
Inc., 1952), pp. 91-92.
^James W. Kuhn, "Right-To-Work Laws— Symbol or Sub­
stance?" Industrial and Labor Relations Review (July, 1961), 
pp. 587-94.
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the union shop, were not decided by as impressive majorities 
as the results would indicate. Only about 77 per cent of the 
eligible voters voted for the union shop. Under right-to-work 
conditions this might mean that perhaps 23 per cent of the 
workers would not join unless persuaded by active union re­
cruitment.®
The second area in which right-to-work laws may have 
more than "minimal" effects, on unions, according to Kuhn, 
is in their expenses and dues receipts. Meyers himself indi­
cated that loss of the union shop might result in as much as 
a six per cent average loss in membership. Not only will 
this result in a reduction in dues received, but the cost of 
active recruitment will be increased. At the same time, the 
unions would still have to provide the full services of 
representing and protecting all workers that they now furnish. 
If, as Meyers suggests, unions are forced to provide addition­
al services and process an increased number of grievances for 
wavering members, costs wiil go up while dues, at best, will
gno more than remain the same. The direct inquiry part of 
this study, the questionnaire, correspondence and interviews, 
inquired into both the areas suggested by Kuhn.
8Ibid.. pp. 588-91 9Ibid., pp. 391-93
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THE DIRECT INQUIRY
This part of this study was begun with a questionnaire 
and followed by correspondence and personal interviews. The 
questionnaire was confidential and limited to thirteen ques­
tions which could be answered simply by "Yes" or "No," be­
cause it was expected that a short, easily answered, confi­
dential questionnaire would elicit a greater response. The 
respondents were asked to identify themselves so that more 
detailed information could be obtained through further cor­
respondence and personal interviews.
It was recognized that there were two problems which 
had to be anticipated in order to secure a response from 
which reliable conclusions could be reached. The first was 
the problem of assuring the representativeness of the informa­
tion received. Because of budget limitations and inasmuch 
as there were only nineteen right-to-work states a statistical 
method of sampling was not used. Instead, it was decided to 
inquire into the opinions of the three groups which would be 
most likely to have an informed opinion on the subject: (1)
the APL-CIO, (2) the Chamber of Commerce, and (3) employers 
who had made the decision to locate in a right-to-work state. 
Accordingly, the inquiry was directed to individuals holding 
office in, or having positions of responsibility in, these
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groups, people whose opinions were believed to be representa­
tive of their group. The response was analyzed according to 
group as a check to see if the individual response was typical 
of the group opinion. Where questions arose, supplemental 
inquiry was made.
The second problem was that of bias. Because it was 
known that the groups selected were special interest groups, 
the response from each group was analyzed separately and com­
pared with the response from the other groups to detect 
differences of opinion. It was expected some of the questions 
would be answered by only one group in areas where the other 
groups had no information. For this reason the questionnaire 
was constructed in a manner calculated to detect intentional 
misinformation and emotional or uninformed opinion. Because 
the response, in general, seemed to indicate complete candor, 
the information received is believed to be the considered 
opinion of the respondents based on their observed experiences, 
and the conclusions reached in this study based on such in­
formation are believed reliable although much of the informa­
tion could be obtained from only one source, the admittedly 
partisan group to which it was of special interest.
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Preparation of the Questionnaire
The questionnaire inquired into the effects of right- 
to-work laws on unions and was divided into two sections.
The first section was primarily concerned with the effects 
in plants where workers were already organized and was an 
inquiry into the problems of the preservation of membership, 
organization, and effectiveness. The second section was 
primarily concerned with the effects in plants where workers 
were not yet organized and was an inquiry into the problems 
of recruitment and new plant organizing.
Under the first section, Questions 1 and 2 dealt with 
the free-rider problem and were:
1. Do many union members drop out since the pas­
sage of right-to-work laws in your state?
2. Do many workers who never were union members 
stay out?
The primary purpose of these two questions was to separate
I
the recruitment problem from the union preservation problem 
and in so doing to clarify the purpose of this section of the 
questionnaire so that the answers to the remaining questions 
would be in the proper frame of reference. The answers to 
these questions also could be used to determine the relative 
effects of right-to-work laws in the first section as opposed 
to the second.
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Questions 3 and 4 dealt with grievances and were:
3. Have grievances increased in number? >
4. Has the nature of the grievances changed?
The purpose of these questions was to test whether management 
had become more militant after its power to defeat the union 
in the political arena had been demonstrated.
Questions 5 and 6 dealt with union militancy and were:
5. Do unions process more minor grievances in 
order to keep their membership up since the passage 
of right-to-work laws in your state?
6. Do unions make more contract demands than 
before the passage of right-to-work laws in an 
effort to keep their membership up?
The purpose of these questions was to test whether under 
right-to-work conditions unions had become not more responsi­
ble, but more responsive to the demands of a tiny vocal 
minority of the membership arid whether "every grievance had 
become a crisis."
Question 7 was the last question in the first section 
of the questionnaire and dealt with union effectiveness or 
bargaining power in organized plants. It was:
JfoicefUccept for union security clauses, has there 
been any substantial change from the contract pro­
visions unions were able to negotiate before the
passage of right-to-work laws in your state?
The purpose of this question was to test whether the effects
of right-to-work laws was "minimal" in organized plants in
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the matter of contract negotiation.
Under the second section, Questions 8, 9, and 10 dealt 
with NLRB representation elections and organizing in unor­
ganized plants. They were:
8. Have right-to-work laws had an effect on the 
number of elections held in your state?
9. Are NLRB elections easier or harder for unions 
to win in a right-to-work state?
10. Is it harder for a union to organize a plant 
since the passage of right-to-work laws in your 
state? If so1, how?
Questions 8 and 9 had two purposes. First, they were to 
change the frame of reference from union preservation to re­
cruitment and organizing. Second, the answers to these 
questions could be compared with the NLRB reports and this 
would give some indication of the reliability of the ques4--- 
tionnaire answers in general. Question 10 is almost a re- 
phrasal of Questions 8 and 9 but includes plants that do not 
fall under NLRB jurisdiction. Any difference between answers 
to Questions 8 and 9 and Question 10 would open an area for 
more detailed information.
Questions 11, 12, and 13 were grouped under the heading, 
court cases, and dealt with unfair labor practice charges 
against both employers and against unions brought before the 
NLRB and with the use of injunctions by the state courts.
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They were:
11. Has anything happened to the number or dis­
position of NLRB unfair labor practice charges 
against employers in your state since the passage 
of right-to-work laws?
12. Has anything happened to the number or dis­
position of NLRB unfair labor practice charges 
against unions in your state since the passage of 
right-to-work laws?
13. Has there been a change in the use of the
injunction by the state courts against unions since
the passage of right-to-work laws in your state?
If so, in what way?
Questions 11 and 12 had three purposes. First, the answers 
to these questions could be checked against the NLRB reports 
and this would give some indication of the reliability of the 
questionnaire answers in general. Second, the answers to 
these two questions could be compared with the answers regard­
ing both employer and union militancy (Questions 3, 4, 5, and 
6). Third, they led the line of response from what should be 
a rather uniform application and interpretation of the Federal 
law to the more diverse experience under the state courts and 
state laws. The purpose of Question 13 was to investigate 
whether right-to-work laws, by providing additional grounds 
for the issuance of an injunction, affected union activities
in more than a minimal way.
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Mailing and Response to the Questionnaire
The questionnaire was mailed to three groups whose
-
responses were analyzed separately. First, the AFL-CIO of­
fices at the state level in all the right-to-work states.
It was considered that these labor unions would have had first­
hand experience with the right-to-work laws. The questions 
were asked about problems with which they continually had to 
contend. It was believed that by mailing the questionnaire 
to the highest office in each state, an over-all composite or 
average answer could be received which would be less likely 
to be colored by emotionalism, or particular isolated experi­
ences. The response from this group was considered to be so 
important that the questionnaires were followed by personal 
interviews in all cases where the response was lacking or con­
sidered inadequate so that a 100 per cent return was received 
from the 19 offices.
The second group to which the questionnaire was sent 
was the Chamber of Commerce offices at the state level in all 
the right-to-work states. It was recognized that the Chamber 
of Commerce organizations would probably not have first-hand 
experience with the effects of right-to-work laws on unions 
and would not have had to solve any of the problems which
i
the right-to-work laws posed to unions; but the Chamber of
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Commerce organizations did support right-to-work legislation 
publicly and did work with the problems of industrial loca­
tion, in which they usually listed the presence of a right- 
to-work law as an advantage to a firm considering locating 
within a given state. Further, the Chamber of Commerce 
organizations are composed of organized business and industry 
and as such represent the composite thinking of that group.
Out of 19 questionnaires mailed to this group there were 10
r
returns or a 53.per cent return from the second group.
The questionnaire was mailed to the third group through 
a re-mailing process. It was desired to reach those firms 
which had the following characteristics. (1) They should be 
employers of labor. (2) The firms should have located sub­
sequent to the, passage of right-to-work laws in their states, 
and they should have made the location decision fairly 
recently so that they might better remember the factors con­
sidered. (3) They should have been attracted, in part at 
least, through the efforts of their state's Chamber of Com­
merce.
To accomplish this, a group of three questionnaires 
ready for re-mailing was enclosed in a letter to the Chamber 
of Commerce office at the state level in each right-to-work 
state with a request that they be re-mailed to companies which
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they had succeeded in attracting to their state within the 
past five years and which were employers of labor. Out of 19 
sets mailed out, three sets were returned by the Chamber of 
Commerce offices with pamphlets and information, apparently 
in an effort to be generally helpful. This reduced the mail­
ing to 48 questionnaires. There is no way of telling how 
many of these were re-mailed, but there was a return from 10 
companies in nine states. One of the company returns was 
from a firm of attorneys who handled the labor relations 
problems for the firm, and one of the company returns was 
from a management consultant firm to whom it had been referred 
for answer. If all the 48 questionnaires were in fact re­
mailed, this constituted a 21 per cent return from the third 
group.
The Replies of the AFL-CIO
Question]1. Do many members drop out since the pas­
sage of right-to-work laws in your state?
The answers received were: No-8, Yes-6, In some cases-3, and
Don't know-2. These were accompanied by the following ex­
planatory remarks.
No. We have had right-to-work laws a long time 
and the reason our members join is because of the 
bad attitude of the right-to-work employers.
^Union questionnaire No. 15.
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It depends on the type union involved and 
whether a union security provision was in effect 
before. 11-
Yes, in a plant that has been organized for years 
we got a note from the union saying that right-to-work 
was killing them because they lost about 50 per,_cent 
of their membership. This is more true of CIO than 
AFL unions.12
Yes, We get drop outs unless we can get an 
agency shop clause in our contracts. In the State
of ___________  the agency shop has nullified the
right-to-work law.13
From the above remarks and from interviews it appeared 
that unions as a whole do not consider the "drop out" as a 
major problem under right-to-work laws. The remarks indicated 
that it was less of a prpblem in the skilled trades unions 
than in the general craft unions,_and that it was more tempo­
rary than permanent. As time passed after the passage of 
right-to-work laws there was less wavering membership and 
unions developed other forms of union security.
Question 2; Do many workers who never were union 
members stay out?
The union answer to this was an unqualified "Yes." In each
state the union considered this a major problem created by
■^Union questionnaire No. 2.
^Union questionnaire No. 1.
13Union questionnaire No. 9.
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right-to-work legislation. Since the second section of the 
questionnaire dealt with this problem in more detail, the 
unions confined their comments to those questions.
Since Questions 3 and 4 are related, the answers to 
these questions are set forth first, and then the questions 
are discussed together.
Question 3: Have grievances increased in number?
The answers received were: Yes-14, No-4, and Don't know-1.
Question 4: Has the nature of the grievances
changed?
The answers received were: Yes-8, No-9, and Don't know-2.
These two questions were accompanied by the following 
explanatory remarks:
Yes. This is due to a great extent to management's 
•harassment tactics in their efforts to destroy the 
union.14
Yes. Management has pushed grievances because it 
costs the union to process them. This keeps the 
unions financially weak and keeps them from exerting 
themselves organizing some place else.^5
Yes. Many- of them are over contract violations 
that management would not attempt except for weakened 
conditions of unions because of right-to-work laws.
l^union questionnaire No. 3.
l^Union questionnaire No. 1.
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Many are minor, and could and should be settled 
in the first step. Often management refused, in 
an attempt to convince them [the workers] that the 
union is unable to do anything for them, thus en- 
cquraging them to drop out.16
Yes, Unions have to process grievances even of 
non-members whom they represent in a plant. If we 
do not process these, even if they have little 
merit we get into trouble.I7
Prom the union viewpoint at least, it appears that the 
passages of right-to-work laws may have resulted in some 
hardening of management's anti-union attitude into anti-union 
action. Before drawing any conclusion from the above, the 
answers to Question 5, which is the other side of the coin,, 
should be considered.
Question 5: Do unions process more minor grievances
in order to keep their membership up since the passage 
of right-to-work laws in your state?
The union answers to this question were: Yes-14, No-4, and
Perhaps-1. There were only two comments made. These were to
the "No" answers, and took the attitude that unions have
always processed all grievances, minor or otherwise, for all
workers. The answers seem to indicate, however, that unions
do tend to process some grievances under right-to-work
l^Union questionnaire No. 5.
l^Union questionnaire No. 14.
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conditions which they would not otherwise handle. In an 
interview one unionist stated that the union must show the 
workerfe that it is willing to "Go to bat" for them and that 
their interest lies in becoming and remaining members of the 
union. One unionist said it plainly in the following way:
'Because neither side is united there may be 
some members and non-members who are rumor 
spreaders and who create violence and cause prob­
lems. Both management and labor have to process
a lot of grievances neither one really cares about.18 ,1
Prom the answers to Questions 3, 4, and 5 it would 
seem that perhaps Meyers was right about grievances. The 
grievance forum is one of the battle grounds in which unions 
admit they skirmish in part for membership purposes as a 
result of the right-to-work laws and in which they believe 
management also skirmishes in part at least to impede unions.
Question 6: Do unions make more contract demands
than before the passage of right-to-work laws in an 
effort to keep their membership up?
The answers to this question were: No-11, Yes-8, and Don't
know-1.
There were some accompanying comments which clarify 
the union attitude on this point. They were:
18 ^Union questionnaire No. 15.
175
No. A weakened union is in no position to make 
strong demands.I9
No. Not really, in bargaining a union always 
lists many demands, but doesn't expect to get all 
it asks. You must have some demands that you can 
compromise on. We have always included many of 
this kind.20
Yes. I suppose there is a tendency to do this, 
but that isn't saying that it affects the contract 
much.2 -̂
From the mixed answers which came in from the ques­
tionnaire and from the comments on the question it did not 
seem that making more contract demands to satisfy a wavering 
membership was a recognized part of the effects of right-to- 
work laws on union behavior. This point was brought up" in 
some of the interviews for clarification. The answer seemed 
to be that if some minority members wanted some additional 
demands made in the contract negotiation, these would be in­
cluded in the demand package. If there were enough importance 
placed on these demands, they would be pushed, but that this 
was part of normal bargaining and not attributable to the ' 
effects of right-to-work laws.
^•°Union questionnaire No. 5.
^°Union questionnaire No. 18. 
21Union questionnaire No. 1.
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Question 7: Except for union security clauses, 
has there been any substantial change from the con­
tract provisions unions were able to negotiate before 
the passage of right-to-work laws in your state?
The union answers to this question were: Yes-12, No-5, and
It depends-2.
This was the most important question in this section 
of the questionnaire and as such provoked comment from almost 
all respondents. These were in part as follows:
No. There is no change because we have substituted 
the agency shop.22
No. There is no change in large multi-plant inter­
state companies.22
No. There is no change, but negotiation is much 
more difficult.24
It Depends. There is no change where the unions were 
already strong, but the smaller unions are hurt and will 
never recover.25
Yes. We can't get the workers behind the union 
now.25
Yes. Unions are offer-takers now because they 
can't shut down a plant. In automated industries
22Union questionnaire No. 4 and No. 12.
23Union questionnaire No. 2.
24Union questionnaire No. 7.
25Union questionnaire No. 13, No. 5 and No. 9
26Union questionnaire No. 17.
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supervisors can run a plant with only a handful 
of non-members and the union can't enforce its
demands.27
Yes. Employers are toughfer in right-to-work 
states because there are more unemployed there 
to break the strike.28
Yes. Wages are lower n o w .29
Those unionists interviewed also believed generally 
that unions were less effective in their contract negotiations 
because of the effects of right-to-work laws. The results 
from these interviews and answers to the question suggested 
the following conclusions.
Where a company has a multi-plant operation or oper­
ates in both right-to-work states and non-right-to-work 
states, the effects of the law are reduced because there is 
a tendency for the contracts to be uniform.
Where a substitute form of union security has been 
adopted, the effects of right-to-work laws are reduced, but 
this is generally possible only in the traditional areas of 
the union shop where there are strong unions.
Where a plant operation is involved, the skilled
2^Union questionnaire No. 1 and No. 9.
2®Union questionnaire No. 14.
^9Union questionnaire No. 6 and' No. 11.
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trade unions are affected to a lesser degree than the more 
general craft unions. With high degrees of automation, the 
right-to-work laws affect the bargaining power of even the 
strong unions adversely.
The ability of right-to-work laws to affect union con­
tract negotiation adversely is related to employee turnover 
in a company. Unless some sort of hiring hall procedure can 
be used, employee turnover dilutes union strength under right- 
to-work conditions. In the construction business and in 
businesses where employment tends to be more casual, union 
bargairiingppower is particularly hampered by right-to-work 
laws.
Not all union bargaining difficulties which seem to 
be present in right-to-work states were attributed to the 
effects of right-to-work laws. It was admitted that the 
seemingly greater number of unemployed in right-to-work states, 
whose presence made employers tougher and caused unions to be 
contract-takers, originated, in part at least, from other 
causes such as mechanization of farms and surplus farm, popula­
tion.
Because they are closely related, Questions 8, 9, and 
10 are discussed together below.
Question 8: Have right-to-work laws had an effect
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on the number of [NLRB representation]' elections 
held in your state?
The answers to this question were: Yes-11, No-3, and Don't
know-5.
There were two kinds of "Yes" answers. "Yes-more"-3, 
and "Yes-less"-8. The following two comments are typical of 
these two opinions.
There are more and were it not for right-to-work, 
many employers would recognize the union and not 
force an NLRB election.30
There are less because of management's ability to 
sell to the workers the fact that their rights would 
be taken away if they joined the union; however, as 
time passes, workers are now beginning to see through 
the so-called right-to-work issues.31
Question 9: Are NLRB elections easier or harder
for unions to win in a right-to-work state?
The answers to this question were: Harder-17, Neither-1, and
Don't know-1.
I ■ The comments of those who answered "Harder" were gen­
erally placed following Question 10. The other two answers 
were qualified by the following comments:
We have no enabling act to our right-to-work law.
All they can do is sue you so it has no effect on
■^Union questionnaire No. 3.
3-kjnion questionnaire No. 4.
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the number or outcome of NLRB elections.32
We don't have any breakdown on that. There has 
been a decline in industry volume and employment in
______  generally in the past 4 years. Industrial
growth has been chiefly in smaller plants located in 
country areas and using local farmers and high school 
graduates. There hasn't been a great deal of union 
organizing done in _______ in the last 4 years.33
Question 10: Is it harder for a union to organize
a plant since the passage of right-to-work laws in 
your state? If so, how?
The union answers to this question were: Harder-18, and
Don't know-1. The unionist who didn't know was the same one 
who in the previous question had indicated a general indus­
trial decline in his state, but the rest of the answers were 
accompanied by the following comments which are fairly uni­
form.
Right-to-work laws seem to emphasize an anti­
union atmosphere and make it harder to get enough
members.3^
Employers who don't want their employees to 
organize have discharged some and made their 
future as employees very difficult. Under our 
law those who fight unionism are protected, but, 
those who wish to join get no help or protection 
in their belief.35
Organizing a plant and being a strong union are
32Union questionnaire No. 15.
33Union questionnaire No. 1.
34-•^Unxon questionnaire No. 2 and No. 9.
35Union questionnaire No. 5 &id No. 13.
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two different things now. I know of one plant in
________  where the percentage of the workers in the
uniorl has always been less than 50 per cent. The 
company knows this but does not ask for decertifica­
tion. The union representatives believe that should 
an election be held that those not belonging to the 
union would vote for the union realizing that the 
union does make many contributions, yet they will not 
join and pay their fair share.
. It is harder because the workers know that the 
union won't be as strong since all won't have to 
belong.37
It will be remembered that in Chapter VII this study 
investigated the effects of right-to-work laws on NLRB 
representation elections. Although it found no effect either 
in number of elections held or in the results of these elec­
tions which it could attribute to the effects of right-to- 
work laws, it did find that in right-to-work states unions 
lost a greater percentage of such elections than the national 
average-, both before and after the passage of right-to-work 
laws, that nationwide and over time unions were losing a 
greater percentage of these elections, and that right-torrwork 
states seemed to follow the national trend.
The union answers to Questions 8 and 9 are not in con­
flict with these findings, although they do attribute the
3®Union questionnaire, No. 8, No. 10, and No. 16.
3^Union questionnaire No. 11.
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greater percentage of elections lost by unions to the effects 
of right-to-work laws. This gives some measure of credence 
to their answers to Question 10 in which they say that organ­
izing a plant is harder in right-rto-work states.
Because Questions 11, 12, and 13 are closely related 
they are discussed together below.
Question 11: Has anything happened to the number
and disposition of NLRB unfair labor practice charges 
against employers in your state since the passage of 
right-to-work laws?
The answers to this question were: No-7, Yes-6, and Don't
know-6.
Question 12: Has anything happened to the number
and disposition of NLRB unfair labor practice charges 
against unions in your state since the passage of 
righ't-to-work laws?
The answers to this question were: No-9, Yes-4, and Don't
know-6.
t
There was very little comment on these two questions. 
Those respondents who answered "No" and "Don't know" in most 
cases had never considered the possibility that unfair labor 
practices charges against either an employer or a union might 
be affected by right-to-work laws. The only comments came 
from those who answered "Yes" and were as follows:
We could bring many against the employer but they 
are expensive to process so many fall by the wayside.
/
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Here again the employer has money/ law and time 
on his side. On just about every occasion that 
unions have attempted organization such charges 
of "unfair Practices" are brought by employers/ 
but things are changing,labor seems to be having 
more of a chance.3®
It seems that in right-to-work states the em­
ployer's attitude is harder and when unions try 
to organize,the employers do more unfair practices 
and bring unfair practices charges against unions.39
Yes. We just finished a drive to organize the 
hotel industry and some employers got pretty des­
perate. It is related to right-to-work.4^
Question 13: Has there been a change in the use
of the injunction by the state courts against unions 
since the passage of right-to-work laws in your state? 
If so, in what way?
The union answers to this question were: Yes-15, No-3, and
jj
Don't know-1.
This question was accompanied by much comment which
ran as follows:
No. We have a special statute on injunctions 
that is outside of the right-to-work law.4^
Yes it is abused.42
OQJOUnion questionnaire No. 13.
39Union questionnaire No. 18.
4®Union questionnaire No. 19.
4-LUnion questionnaire No. 19, . . . j
AOUnion questionnaire No. 11 and No. 15.
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Yes. The right-to-work law just gives the 
court another grounds for issuing an injunction.43
Yes. I have an injunction against me now en­
joining my intent.44
No. The courts have always made a practice of 
using it wherever possible.45
Yes. _______  has become a "justice by injunc­
tion" state. An employer can simply make wild 
charges and get an injunction, restraining picket­
ing and just about any other action, with a hearing 
some 60 days later, then even if the charges are 
untrue the case is lost through timing.46
Yes, although labor's strength in this state is 
growing and we are able to get verdicts in our 
favor unheard of in earlier years.47
Since the answers to Questions 11 and 12 could be 
checked against the NLRB reports, these questions were in­
cluded in the questionnaire to give some indication as to 
the validity of the answers to Question 13. In Chapter VII 
it was found that there was a national tendency for there 
to be a higher proportion of unfair labor practice charges 
brought against employers than against unions and in right- 
to-work states the proportion of unfair labor practice
43union questionnaire'No. 1, 8, 10, 14, 16, and 17. 
^Union questionnaire No. 15.
4^union questionnaire No. 12.
 ̂ .
^Union questionnaire No. 2 and No. 13.
^Union questionnaire No. 4.
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charges brought against employers tended to be higher than 
the national average. No tendency was found in right-to-work 
states for the proportion of these CA charges against em­
ployers to change as compared with the national average, and 
no tendency was found for the number of unfair practice cases • 
(CA plus CB) to change as compared with the national average.
The fact that the union answers, in general, failed to 
associate this type of case with the effects of right-to-work 
laws, a fact which the National Labor Relations Board statis­
tics confirmed, rules out emotionalism and lends credence to 
their answers to Question 13 in which they say that state 
courts have used the right-to-work law as another ground for 
the issuance of injunctions against union activity and so 
have affected union organization activity adversely.
Summary of AFL-CIO response. The total union response 
can be summarized generally as follows: Right to work laws
impede union growth. They cause member "drop outs" when first 
enacted. "Drop outs" do not remain a problem, but the recruit-, 
ment of new members is made a continuous and difficult problem.
Unions find it harder to organize plants in right-to- 
work states. This is partly because of the increased use of 
injunctions against union activity, partly because workers
i
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hesitate to join a union they feel will be weak and have to 
face strong anti-union opposition, and partly because of the 
anti-union social attitude.
Both unions and employers process more petty grievances 
as a result of right-to-work laws. This impairs industrial 
peace and is a major result of right-to-work laws.
Even though unions may be able to organize a plant, 
they are not able to negotiate as good contracts under right- 
to-work conditions unless a substitute form of union security 
can be adopted. This is partly because workers know they do 
not have to join the union to get many of the benefits the 
unipn might negotiate. Their failure to join weakens the 
union's ability to enforce its demands. The adverse effects 
of right-to-work laws are generally less if the employer has 
a multiplant interstate operation reaching into non-right-to- 
work states. The skilled crafts unions are generally less 
adversely affected than the more general trades unions. The 
adverse effects are increased if a high degree of automation 
is involved. Conditions of rapid employee turnover increase' 
the adverse effects of right-to-work laws on union bargaining 
power.
The Replies of Chambers of Commerce
Although the response from the Chamber of Commerce
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offices was good and there was a 53 per cent return, the 
answers to the questionnaire indicated that this group as a 
whole did not have first-hand information about the effects 
of right-to-work laws on unions; consequently, this report 
is not complicated with a detailed question by question dis­
cussion of their replies. A general discussion of the answers 
does give some insight into the controversy however.
There were ten responses. Five of these ten gave, in 
substance, the same reply which is quoted from one of them as 
follows:
While this organization supported passage of right-
to-work legislation in   and, subsequently, the
writing of it into the Constitution, we have made no 
study of the effects on labor relations in the state.
It is not known whether this is the result of a lack of great
concern, or the result of reluctance to answer the questions.
The remaining five responses can be summarized as 
follows: the respondents believed that Union members did not
drop out, but some conceded that non-members tended to stay 
out. No respondent thought that right-to-work laws caused 
any change in the number or nature of grievances. One 
thought that perhaps unions tended to process more minor 
grievances and another thought that unions tended to make
^®Chamber of Commerce questionnaire No. 3.
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more contract demands in order to keep their membership up.
No respondent thought that unions were less effective in the 
contracts they were able to negotiate. No one thought that 
right-to-work laws had any effect on the number of NLRB 
representation elections held or their outcome. Two respond­
ents thought that unions were finding it harder to organize 
plants. Their reasons were as follows:
They find it harder because the majority are 
not sold on "union" domination.49
It is harder because bullying and goon-squad 
methods are not tolerated.50
One respondent thought that there were more unfair labor
practices against employers, not because of right-to-work
laws, but because the NLRB had moved to the left, and one
thought that there were more charges against employers because
unions were getting more intelligent. Otherwise no one
thought that there were any more unfair labor practices either
against employers or against unions, and no one thought that
there was any change in the use of the injunction by the state
courts as a result of right-to-work laws.
The replies indicated that the Chamber of Commerce
49chamber. of Commerce questionnaire No. 10.
50Chamber of Commerce questionnaire No. 2.
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respondents either did not know or did not believe that 
right-to-work laws had any effect on union effectiveness, but 
some did believe that right-to-work laws have a deterring 
effect on union growth and recruitment. There was some ex­
pression that the right-to-work laws contributed to.: indus­
trial peace.
The Replies of Firms
The replies of different firms to the questionnaire 
indicated that these firms at least did not have general 
first-hand information about the effects of right-to-work 
laws on unions. Their answers reflected more their own 
particular experiences with unions. Because these answers 
were generally alike their response to the questionnaire is 
discussed generally rather than in detail.
There were ten responses of which eight were from 
companies. These companies agreed that they could detect no 
effect that right-to-work laws might have upon unions, 
grievances, bargaining effectiveness, ability to organize a 
plant, or the use of the injunction.
One of the responses was from a labor-relations con­
sulting firm who reported as.follows:
If you are honest, you recognize that right-to- 
work laws are but one small, very small, factor in
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the total employee-employer relationship, industrial 
growth, development, etc. Too many factors across 
the nation, unemployment, highlevel national pro­
duction, etc., turnover, mobility of labor— partially 
determined by the current going pension and separa­
tion pay practices, unemployment compensation rules, 
ete., have a far greater effect than right-to-work.
My practice takes me into two right-to-work states 
and two non-right-to-work states. Right now, I am 
currently involved in various stages with 21 cases 
before the NLRB. I can see no significant part played 
by right-to-work in any of them.5^
The other reply was from a firm of attorneys who had 
been sent the questionnaire by a firm, one of their clients, 
for reply. These attorneys report that they find frivolous 
grievances and demands much increased, but that they believe 
unions negotiate about the same contract provisions, no more 
and no less, than they would without right-to-work laws.
They close with this remark:
The real impact of the RTW laws has been on 
bargaining strategy. The granting of agency shop 
has become a trump card.^2
From the answers of business companies and their re­
presentatives several things become apparent. The respondents 
make no claim to know what effects right-to-work laws may 
have on unions internally. They do notice an increase*" in the 
processing of grievances and a disruption of industrial peace.
^Business questionnaire No. 3.
52 .Business questionnaire No. 9.
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To them the right-to-work laws, as a practical thing, are 
only a very small part of the total employee-employer rela­
tionship. If there is any change in the effectiveness of 
unions it is not of a kind that affects their contracts 
other than in the inclusion of the agency shop, a substitute 
form of union security, aimed at restoring industrial peace.
SUMMARY
In the beginning of this chapter some of the existing 
published material was reviewed briefly to indicate the area 
in which the direct inquiry part of this study was conducted. 
It was shown that in one of the few studies made on the sub­
ject Meyers had found that the effects of right-to-work laws 
on unions was minimal, but that he had found that, periph­
erally, the statute had had some effect in preventing the 
organization of certain unorganized crafts, that the statute 
could have had the effect of reducing union membership by 
about six per cent of the total eligible employees in 
organized manufacturing bargaining units, that the statute 
could have been used to emphasize an anti-union social atmos­
phere and that it had made the unions not more responsible 
but more responsive to a tiny vocal minority of the member­
ship.
192
The English experience with "contracting in" and "con­
tracting out" of the Labor Party was reviewed as an analogy 
to voluntary unionism and the union shop to infer that the 
effects of right-to-work laws might be more than minimal.
The article of James W. Kuhn, critical of Meyers con­
clusions, was reviewed to show that the right-to-work laws 
could have effects that were more than minimal in the re­
cruitment of new members and in union growth and effective­
ness, and that the effects could also be more than minimal 
on union strength by increasing union expenses and reducing 
union receipts.
The direct study was made by using a questionnaire 
followed by correspondence and personal interviews. The 
details of the construction of the questionnaire, its mailing 
and the response were explained so that the validity of the 
conclusions reached might be evaluated and the areas in which 
more direct inquiry is needed would be apparent.
The direct study was of limited scope and was directed 
to three groups— the AFL-CIO state organization offices in 
right-to-work states, the Chamber of Commerce state organiza­
tion offices in right-to-work states, and 57 employers of 
labor (three in each right-to-work state) who had been 
attracted at least in part through the efforts of the Chamber
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of Commerce in their state and had made the location decision 
within the past five years.
The results of this study failed to disclose an over­
all pattern of effects of right-to-work laws on unions which 
is agreed upon by all groups, but the composite report from, 
all groups does indicate that right-to-work laws do affect 
unions and industrial peace in ways that are more than mini­
mal.
The APL-CIO group reported that right-to-work laws 
impede union growth and hamper recruitment. When they are 
first passed they cause some member "drop outs" an effect 
which has a tendency to decline, but the recruitment of new 
members is made a continuous and more difficult problem. It 
is harder to organize plants in right-to-work states partly 
because of the increased use of injunctions against union 
activity, partly because workers hesitate to join a union 
they feel will be weak and have to face strong anti-union 
opposition, and partly because of the anti-union social atti­
tude. Both unions and management process more petty griev­
ances as a result of right-to-work laws, and this impairs 
industrial peace.
Even though unions may be able to organize a plant, 
they are not able to negotiate as good contracts under
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right-to-work conditions unless a substitute form of union 
security can be adopted. This is partly because workers do 
not have to join the union to get many benefits they may 
negotiate. As a result the union is unable to get enough 
workers behind it to enforce its demands. The adverse effects 
are less in multiplant interstate industry and less in the 
skilled trades unions. They are more where a high degree of 
automation is involved or where there are conditions of more 
rapid employee turnover.
The Chamber of Commerce group reported a lack of 
knowledge about the effects of right-to-work laws, but there 
was some indication that they believed the union recruitment 
problem was made more difficult, that there might tend to be 
more grievances processed and that unions might tend to find 
it harder to organize new plants. There was no indication 
that any of this group thought that unions could not negotiate 
as beneficial contracts as before the passage of right-to-work 
laws.
The group of firms reported that they could detect no 
effect of right-to-work laws upon unions, grievances, bargain­
ing effectiveness, ability to organize a plant or the use of 
the injunction. There was a slight indication that griev­
ances might have been increased, and there was one reply to
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the effect that substitute union security measures had been 
contrived to restore industrial peace. This group seemed to 
indicate that as a practical matter to the businessman, the 
right-to-work laws were only a small part of the total em­




EFFECTS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS ON UNION ORGANIZATION, 
GROWTH, AND EFFECTIVENESS
Right-to-work laws impede union growth. They cause 
member "drop outs" when first enacted. "Drop outs" do not 
remain a problem, but the recruitment of new members is made 
a continuous and difficult problem.
Right-to-work laws impede union organization. Unions 
find it harder to organize a plant in right-to-work states 
partly because of the increased use of injunctions against 
union activity, partly because workers hesitate to join a 
union they feel will be weak and have to face strong anti­
union opposition, and partly because of the anti-union 
social attitude.
Right-to-work laws impede union effectiveness. Even 
though unions may be able to organize a plant, they are not 
able to negotiate as good contract provisions under right- 
to-work conditions unless a substitute form of union security
196
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can be adopted. This is partly because workers know they do 
not have to join the union to get many of the benefits the 
union might negotiate. Their failure to join reduces the 
union's ability to enforce its demands because it weakens the 
union financially and because the union cannot get concerted 
worker action to back its enforcement strategy.
The adverse effects of right-to-work laws are generally 
less if the employer has a multiplant interstate operation 
reaching into non-right-to-work states. The skilled craft 
unions are generally less adversely affected than the more 
general trades unions. The adverse effects are increased if 
a high degree of automation'is involved. Conditions of rapid 
employee turnover increase the adverse effects of right-to- • 
work laws on union bargaining power.
EFFECTS OF RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL PEACE
Right-to-work laws have an adverse effect on labor- 
management relations and industrial peace. Both unions and 
employers, process more minor grievances as a result of right- 
to-work laws. Some unions do this to show the workers that 
they are willing to "Go to bat" for them and that their 
interest lies in becoming and remaining members of the union.
Some employers do this to harass union members. Other em­
ployers take advantage of the fact that unions must represent 
non-members as well as members and use the grievance procedure 
to wear the union out.
Right-to-work laws disrupt industrial peace because 
they have a tendency to emphasize an anti-union social atmos­
phere and harden the anti-union attitudes of some employers 
into anti-union action. In situations where the injunction 
can be used against union activity forbidden under the 
statute, some anti-union employers use it to impede general 
union activity, and so abuse its use.
The need to alleviate these detrimental effects on 
labor-management relations and industrial peace explains, in 
part, a tendency among some employers and unions to nullify 
the right-to-work laws by finding substitutes for the pro­
scribed means of achieving union security and to evade the 
law.
EFFECTS OF RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS ON 
INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
As an economic factor in industrial growth the effects 
of right-to-work laws are limited in scope. Classical compet- 
itive-jsmarkett least-cost location theory is only a part of
modem comprehensive maximum-profit location theory. It 
seeks to solve only the demand or cost side of the problem 
of the locating firm. Modern location theory shows that 
there is also a market or selling side to the problem for the 
locating firm. This side contains such monopolistic elements 
as spatial discrimination between customers through freight 
absorption and non-price competition in the market-area and 
locational-interdependence aspects of spatial economics. An 
analysis of the practices of firms making the locating deci­
sion discloses not only that firms recognize these aspects 
of the modern location problem, but that the market consider­
ations are the most important of all the economic location 
factors to most firms. The presence or absence of right-to- 
work legislation is not a part of the analysis of the market 
for the products of the firm; consequently, it cannot be 
ejected to have any direct impact on the location decision 
through the firm's analysis of its market. It may have an 
indirect impact on the locational decision however, if the 
market analysis discloses favorable enough conditions to 
allow the firm to avoid unionism for non-economic reasons.
Where right-to-work laws have any beneficial effect 
on industrial growth at all, it is small. The presence or 
absence of right-to-work legislation is a part of the
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analysis of the costs of a firm because right-to-work laws 
through their adverse effects on unionism offer the possibi­
lity of reducing labor costs. It has already been pointed 
out that most firms consider the positive monopolistic ad­
vantages of the market side of the location more important, 
but there are some firms which face a competitive market and 
can not avail themselves of monopolistic advantages of the 
market. In these firms a favorable cost structure is neces­
sary for profitable operation and even survival. It is here 
that locational advantages in cost have their greatest 
effect upon the location decision of the firm. Labor cost 
is just one (although perhaps the most important one) of 
many cost-based location factors. Right-to-work laws as one 
facet in the total employer-employee relationship offer the 
possibility of some reduction in labor cost. Although this 
is a favorable factor, it is not sufficient to be decisive 
in very many instances.
CONCLUSION
This study has led to the conclusion that right-to- 
work laws impede union organization, growth, and effective­
ness. In addition, they have an adverse effect on labor- 
management relations and industrial peace. As an economic
201
factor in industrial growth, these effects of right-to-work 
laws are limited in scope, and where right-to-work laws have 
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